相关论文: Evolutionary Dilemmas in a Social Network

In the framework of the evolutionary dynamics of the Prisoner's Dilemma game on complex networks, we investigate the possibility that the average level of cooperation shows hysteresis under quasi-static variations of a model parameter (the…

Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with…

Individuals might abstain from participating in an instance of an evolutionary game for various reasons, ranging from lack of interest to risk aversion. In order to understand the consequences of such diverse activity patterns on the…

An active participation of players in evolutionary games depends on several factors, ranging from personal stakes to the properties of the interaction network. Diverse activity patterns thus have to be taken into account when studying the…

Humans and other animals can adapt their social behavior in response to environmental cues including the feedback obtained through experience. Nevertheless, the effects of the experience-based learning of players in evolution and…

We have developed an evolutionary game model, where agents can choose between two forms of social participation: interaction via online social networks and interaction by exclusive means of face-to-face encounters. We illustrate the…

We show that the success of cooperation in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on a complex network can be predicted by a simple, quantitative network analysis using mean field parameters. The criterion is shown to be accurate on a wide…

Recent developments of eco-evolutionary models have shown that evolving feedbacks between behavioral strategies and the environment of game interactions, leading to changes in the underlying payoff matrix, can impact the underlying…

Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the spatial dynamical rules are considered. The players following one of the two pure strategies (cooperation or defection) are distributed on a two-dimensional lattice.…

We study a condition of favoring cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma game on complex networks. There are two kinds of players: cooperators and defectors. Cooperators pay a benefit b to their neighbors at a cost c, whereas defectors only…

In spatial games players typically alter their strategy by imitating the most successful or one randomly selected neighbor. Since a single neighbor is taken as reference, the information stemming from other neighbors is neglected, which…

As humans perceive and actively engage with the world, we adjust our decisions in response to shifting group dynamics and are influenced by social interactions. This study aims to identify which aspects of interaction affect…

We present a novel approach allowing the study of rare events like fixation under fluctuating environments, modeled as extrinsic noise, in evolutionary processes characterized by the dominance of one species. Our treatment consists of…

Population structure induced by both spatial embedding and more general networks of interaction, such as model social networks, have been shown to have a fundamental effect on the dynamics and outcome of evolutionary games. These effects…

Dense cooperative networks are an essential element of social capital for a prosperous society. These networks enable individuals to overcome collective action dilemmas by enhancing trust. In many biological and social settings, network…

This paper studies inference in models of discrete choice with social interactions when the data consists of a single large network. We provide theoretical justification for the use of spatial and network HAC variance estimators in applied…

One of the best examples of traditional analysis of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) is provided by the so called Dove-Hawk model. In this paper we present several enhancements to the model aimed at describing the evolution of…

We study effects of strategy-dependent time delays on equilibria of evolving populations. It is well known that time delays may cause oscillations in dynamical systems. Here we report a novel behavior. We show that microscopic models of…

The paper contains the attempt to integration of the classical evolutionary game theory based on replicator dynamics and the state based approach of Houston and Mcnamara. In the new approach, individuals have different heritable strategies,…

Interactions among individuals in natural populations often occur in a dynamically changing environment. Understanding the role of environmental variation in population dynamics has long been a central topic in theoretical ecology and…