理论经济学
We characterize Pareto optimality via "near" weighted utilitarian welfare maximization. One characterization sequentially maximizes utilitarian welfare functions using a finite sequence of nonnegative and eventually positive welfare…
We study a model of dynamic combinatorial assignment of indivisible objects without money. We introduce a new solution concept called ``dynamic approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes'' (DACEEI), which stipulates that markets…
We introduce and characterize inertial updating of beliefs. Under inertial updating, a decision maker (DM) chooses a belief that minimizes the subjective distance between their prior belief and the set of beliefs consistent with the…
We explore the ways that a reference point may direct attention. Utilizing a stochastic choice framework, we provide behavioral foundations for the Reference-Dependent Random Attention Model (RD-RAM). Our characterization result shows that…
Models of updating a set of priors either do not allow a decision maker to make inference about her priors (full bayesian updating or FB) or require an extreme degree of selection (maximum likelihood updating or ML). I characterize a…
I study the optimal provision of information in a long-term relationship between a sender and a receiver. The sender observes a persistent, evolving state and commits to send signals over time to the receiver, who sequentially chooses…
Cake cutting is a classic fair division problem, with the cake serving as a metaphor for a heterogeneous divisible resource. Recently, it was shown that for any number of players with arbitrary preferences over a cake, it is possible to…
A fundamental result in cake cutting states that for any number of players with arbitrary preferences over a cake, there exists a division of the cake such that every player receives a single contiguous piece and no player is left envious.…
This paper studies a delegation problem faced by the planner who wants to regulate receivers' reaction choices in markets for matching between receivers and senders with signaling. We provide a noble insight into the planner's willingness…
Classical law and economics is foundational to the American legal system. Centered at the University of Chicago, its assumptions, most especially that humans act both rationally and selfishly, informs the thinking of legislatures, judges,…
We present the proof-of-concept for minimalist market design (S\"{o}nmez, 2023) as an effective methodology to enhance an institution based on the desiderata of stakeholders with minimal interference. Four objectives-respecting merit,…
Advertisers in online ad auctions are increasingly using auto-bidding mechanisms to bid into auctions instead of directly bidding their value manually. One prominent auto-bidding format is the target cost-per-acquisition (tCPA) which…
This note presents a unified theorem of the alternative that explicitly allows for any combination of equality, componentwise inequality, weak dominance, strict dominance, and nonnegativity relations. The theorem nests 60 special cases,…
In school choice, students make decisions based on their expectations of particular schools' suitability, and the decision to gather information about schools is influenced by the acceptance odds determined by the mechanism in place. We…
We study a model in which two players with opposing interests try to alter a status quo through instability-generating actions. We show that instability can be used to secure longer-term durable changes, even if it is costly to generate and…
This paper uses value functions to characterize the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of an arbitrary, possibly infinite-horizon game. It specifies the game's extensive form as a pentaform (Streufert 2023p, arXiv:2107.10801v4), which…
This paper introduces the distributionally robust random utility model (DRO-RUM), which allows the preference shock (unobserved heterogeneity) distribution to be misspecified or unknown. We make three contributions using tools from the…
Given an initial matching and a policy objective on the distribution of agent types to institutions, we study the existence of a mechanism that weakly improves the distributional objective and satisfies constrained efficiency, individual…
Winning the coin toss at the end of a tied soccer game gives a team the right to choose whether to kick either first or second on all five rounds of penalty kicks, when each team is allowed one kick per round. There is considerable evidence…
This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which an informed player plays two zero-sum games simultaneously at each stage against two uninformed players. This is a…