理论经济学

We focus on the one-to-one two-sided matching model with two disjoint sets of agents of equal size, where each agent in a set has preferences on the agents in the other set modeled by a linear order. A matching mechanism associates a set of…

When eliciting forecasts from a group of experts, it is important to reward predictions so that market participants are incentivized to tell the truth. Existing mechanisms partially accomplish this but remain susceptible to groups of…

This paper introduces the class of cooperative games with generalized coalition configuration. This new class of games corresponds to cooperative games with coalition configuration and restricted cooperation. A coalition configuration is a…

In games with incomplete and ambiguous information, rational behavior depends not only on fundamental ambiguity (ambiguity about states) but also on strategic ambiguity (ambiguity about others' actions), which further induces hierarchies of…

We study buyer-optimal procurement mechanisms when quality is contractible. When some costs are borne by every participant of a procurement auction regardless of winning, the classic analysis should be amended. We show that an optimal…

This paper presents weakened notions of corewise stability and setwise stability for matching markets where agents have substitutable choice functions. We introduce the concepts of worker-quasi-core, firm-quasi-core, and worker-quasisetwise…

We study how fads emerge under social learning in a changing environment. We consider a simple sequential social learning model where rational agents arrive in order, each acting only once, and the underlying unknown state constantly…

We consider an analyst whose goal is to identify a subject's utility function through revealed preference analysis. We argue the analyst's preference about which experiments to run should adhere to three normative principles: The first,…

This paper establishes the equivalence between synchronous and asynchronous coordination mechanisms in dynamic games with strategic complementarities and common interests. Synchronous coordination, characterized by simultaneous commitments,…

We present a theory of expected utility with state-dependent linear utility functions for monetary returns, that incorporates the possibility of loss-aversion. Our results relate to first order stochastic dominance, mean-preserving spread,…

I study a model of costly Bayesian persuasion by a privately and partially informed sender who conducts a public experiment. The cost of running an experiment is the expected reduction of a weighted log-likelihood ratio function of the…

Agents receive private signals about an unknown state. The resulting joint belief distributions are complex and lack a simple characterization. Our key insight is that, when conditioned on the state, the structure of belief distributions…

Two information structures are said to be close if, with high probability, there is approximate common knowledge that interim beliefs are close under the two information structures. We define an "almost common knowledge topology" reflecting…

The premise of industrial symbiosis IS is that advancing a circular economy that reuses byproducts as inputs in production is valuable for the environment. We challenge this premise in a simple model. Ceteris paribus, IS is an…

This paper examines the optimal organizational rules that govern the process of dividing a fixed surplus. The process is modeled as a sequential multilateral bargaining game with costly recognition. The designer sets the voting rule --…

In a two-stage model of choice a decision maker first shortlists a given menu and then applies her preferences. We show that a sizeable class of these models run into significant issues in terms of identification of preferences…

We initiate the study of how auction design affects the division of surplus among buyers. We propose a parsimonious measure for equity and apply it to the family of standard auctions for homogeneous goods. Our surplus-equitable mechanism is…

Game dynamics theory, as a field of science, the consistency of theory and experiment is essential. In the past 10 years, important progress has been made in the merging of the theory and experiment in this field, in which dynamics cycle is…

A committee consisting of two factions is considering a project whose distributive consequences are unknown. This uncertainty can be resolved at some unknown future time. By delaying approval, the committee can gradually learn which faction…

We study the problem of multilateral collaboration among agents with transferable utilities. Any group of agents can sign a contract consisting of a primitive contract and monetary transfers among the signatories. We propose a dynamic…