Quasi-stability notions in two-sided matching models
Theoretical Economics
2024-11-20 v1
Abstract
This paper presents weakened notions of corewise stability and setwise stability for matching markets where agents have substitutable choice functions. We introduce the concepts of worker-quasi-core, firm-quasi-core, and worker-quasisetwise stability. We also examine their relationship to established notions in the literature, such as worker-quasi and firm-quasi stability in both many-to-one and many-to-many markets.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2411.12533,
title = {Quasi-stability notions in two-sided matching models},
author = {Nadia Guiñazú and Noelia Juarez and Pablo Neme and Jorge Oviedo},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2411.12533},
year = {2024}
}