The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings
Theoretical Economics
2022-03-04 v4
Abstract
In a many-to-one matching model in which firms' preferences satisfy substitutability, we study the set of worker-quasi-stable matchings. Worker-quasi-stability is a relaxation of stability that allows blocking pairs involving a firm and an unemployed worker. We show that this set has a lattice structure and define a Tarski operator on this lattice that models a re-equilibration process and has the set of stable matchings as its fixed points.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2103.16330,
title = {The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings},
author = {Agustin G. Bonifacio and Nadia Guinazu and Noelia Juarez and Pablo Neme and Jorge Oviedo},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2103.16330},
year = {2022}
}