理论经济学

We explore how dynamic entry deterrence operates through feedback strategies in markets experiencing stochastic demand fluctuations. The incumbent firm, aware of its own cost structure, can deter a potential competitor by strategically…

In power markets, understanding the cost dynamics of electricity generation is crucial. The complexity of price formation in the power system arises from its diverse attributes, such as various generator types, each characterized by its…

This paper examines a government's strategic resource allocation choices when facing an opposing group whose military power is uncertain. We investigate how this uncertainty affects the government's decision to divide resources in a way…

We study the tiered deferred acceptance mechanism used in school admissions, such as in China and Turkey. This mechanism partitions schools into tiers and applies the deferred acceptance algorithm within each tier. Once assigned, students…

This study considers a model where schools may have multiple priority orders on students, which may be inconsistent with each other. For example, in school choice systems, since the sibling priority and the walk zone priority coexist, the…

Diversification is the typical investment strategy of risk-averse agents. However, non-diversified positions that allocate all resources to a single asset, state of the world or revenue stream are common too. We show that whenever finitely…

The unit value of a commodity that Michio Morishima's method and its variations enable to determine correctly, is the sum of the value of the commodities it contains (inputs) and the quantity of labor required for its production. However,…

We provide a framework to study stability notions for two-sided dynamic matching markets in which matching is one-to-one and irreversible. The framework gives center stage to the set of matchings an agent anticipates would ensue should they…

This paper explores many-to-one matching models, both with and without contracts, where doctors' preferences are private and hospitals' preferences are public and substitutable. It is known that any stable-dominating mechanism --which is…

A fundamental economic question is that of designing revenue-maximizing mechanisms in dynamic environments. This paper considers a simple yet compelling market model to tackle this question, where forward-looking buyers arrive at the market…

This paper provides a new theory of the observed co-movement between overall wage inequality and its between-firm component. We develop and solve analytically a frictionless sorting model with two-sided heterogeneity, in which firms consist…

In privately held startups, restructuring ownership is challenging due to diverse and uncertain valuations among owners. Traditional approaches, including the BMBY mechanism for equal partnerships, fail to address the complexities of…

This paper studies information transmission from multiple senders who compete for the attention of a decision maker. Each sender is partially informed about the state of the world and decides how to reveal her information over time to…

This paper proposes and axiomatizes a new updating rule: Relative Maximum Likelihood (RML) for ambiguous beliefs represented by a set of priors (C). This rule takes the form of applying Bayes' rule to a subset of C. This subset is a linear…

We consider an M/M/1 queueing model where customers can strategically decide to enter or leave the queue. We characterize the class of queueing regimes such that, for any parameters of the model, the socially efficient behavior is an…

Search prominence may have a detrimental impact on a firm's profits in the presence of costly product returns. We analyze the impact of search prominence on firm profitability in a duopoly search model, considering the presence of costly…

This paper studies a simplicity notion in a mechanism design setting in which agents do not necessarily share a common prior. I develop a model in which agents participate in a prior-free game of (coarse) information acquisition followed by…

This paper proposes a framework in which agents are constrained to use simple models to forecast economic variables and characterizes the resulting biases. It considers agents who can only entertain state-space models with no more than d…

Selective contests can impair participants' overall welfare in overcompetitive environments, such as school admissions. This paper models the situation as an optimal contest design problem with binary actions, treating effort costs as…

We analyze a model of selling a single object to a principal-agent pair who want to acquire the object for a firm. The principal and the agent have different assessments of the object's value to the firm. The agent is budget-constrained…