理论经济学
In this paper, I propose a new general equilibrium model that explains stylized facts about venture capitalists' impact on their portfolio firms. Venture capitalists can help increase firms' productivity, yet they face increasing entry…
We introduce an Attention Overload Model that captures the idea that alternatives compete for the decision maker's attention, and hence the attention that each alternative receives decreases as the choice problem becomes larger. Using this…
We examine the implications of consumer privacy when preferences today depend upon past consumption choices, and consumers shop from different sellers in each period. Although consumers are ex ante identical, their initial consumption…
A run of the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm may contain proposals that are sure to be rejected. We introduce the accelerated deferred acceptance algorithm that proceeds in a similar manner to DA but with sure-to-be rejected proposals…
We study a simple model of algorithmic collusion in which Q-learning algorithms are designed in a strategic fashion. We let players (\textit{designers}) choose their exploration policy simultaneously prior to letting their algorithms…
We consider a model where an agent is must choose between alternatives that each provide only an imprecise description of the world (e.g. linguistic expressions). The set of alternatives is closed under logical conjunction and disjunction,…
An agent makes decisions based on multiple sources of information. In isolation, each source is well understood, but their correlation is unknown. We study the agent's robustly optimal strategies -- those that give the best possible…
We define and study obvious strategy-proofness with respect to a partition of the set of agents. It encompasses strategy-proofness as a special case when the partition is the coarsest one and obvious strategy-proofness when the partition is…
When information acquisition is costly but flexible, a principal may rationally acquire information that favors one group over another. The former group faces incentives to invest in becoming productive, while the latter is discouraged from…
This paper introduces dynamic mechanism design in an elementary fashion. We first examine optimal dynamic mechanisms: We find necessary and sufficient conditions for perfect Bayesian incentive compatibility and formulate the optimal dynamic…
We study the robust double auction mechanisms, that is, the double auction mechanisms that satisfy dominant strategy incentive compatibility, ex-post individual rationality and ex-post budget balance. We first establish that the price in…
Two issues of algorithmic collusion are addressed in this paper. First, we show that in a general class of symmetric games, including Prisoner's Dilemma, Bertrand competition, and any (nonlinear) mixture of first and second price auction,…
We employ a unified framework to provide an epistemic-theoretical foundation for Camerer, Ho, and Chong's (2003) cognitive hierarchy (CH) solution and its dynamic extension, using the directed rationalizability concept introduced in…
A principal has $m$ identical objects to allocate among a group of $n$ agents. Objects are desirable and the principal's value of assigning an object to an agent is the agent's private information. The principal can verify up to $k$ agents,…
This paper presents a new rationale for a self-interested economic elite voluntarily extending property rights. When agents make endogenous investment decisions, there is a commitment problem. Ex-post, the elite face strong incentives to…
We consider a set of agents who have claims on an endowment that is not large enough to cover all claims. Agents can form coalitions but a minimal coalition size $\theta$ is required to have positive coalitional funding that is proportional…
We explore the nonlinear dynamics of a macroeconomic model with resource constraints. The dynamics is derived from a production function that considers capital and a generalized form of energy as inputs. Energy, the new variable, is…
Indirect reciprocity is a plausible mechanism for sustaining cooperation: people cooperate with those who have a good reputation, which can be acquired by helping others. However, this mechanism requires the population to agree on who has…
We propose a measure of learning efficiency for non-finite state spaces. We characterize the complexity of a learning problem by the metric entropy of its state space. We then describe how learning efficiency is determined by this measure…
Evidence suggests that participants in strategy-proof matching mechanisms play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal…