理论经济学
We study robustly optimal mechanisms for selling multiple items. The seller maximizes revenue against a worst-case distribution of a buyer's valuations within a set of distributions, called an "ambiguity" set. We identify the exact forms of…
We propose a combinatorial ascending auction that is "approximately" optimal, requiring minimal rationality to achieve this level of optimality, and is robust to strategic and distributional uncertainties. Specifically, the auction is…
An agent acquires information dynamically until her belief about a binary state reaches an upper or lower threshold. She can choose any signal process subject to a constraint on the rate of entropy reduction. Strategies are ordered by "time…
This paper examines an adverse selection environment where a sender with private information (high or low ability) tries to convince a receiver of having higher ability. Without commitment or costly signaling, market failure can occur.…
Does a more transparent climate disclosure policy induce lower emissions? This paper examines the welfare implications of transparency in climate disclosure regulation. Increased disclosure transparency could result in a larger equilibrium…
This paper studies a general class of social choice problems in which agents' payoff functions (or types) are privately observable random variables, and monetary transfers are not available. We consider cardinal social choice functions…
We show that the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling multiple, heterogeneous objects to a buyer with ex ante symmetric and additive values is equivalent to the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling identical…
Interconnected agents such as firms in a supply chain make simultaneous preparatory investments to increase chances of honouring their respective bilateral agreements. Failures cascade: if one fails their agreement, then so do all who…
We characterize those ex-ante restrictions on the random utility model which lead to identification. We first identify a simple class of perturbations which transfer mass from a suitable pair of preferences to the pair formed by swapping…
We propose monotone comparative statics results for maximizers of submodular functions, as opposed to maximizers of supermodular functions as in the classical theory put forth by Veinott, Topkis, Milgrom, and Shannon among others. We…
People often face trade-offs between costs and benefits occurring at various points in time. The predominant discounting approach is to use the exponential form. Central to this approach is the discount rate, a unique parameter that…
We consider sequential search by an agent who cannot observe the quality of goods but can acquire information by buying signals from a profit-maximizing principal with limited commitment power. The principal can charge higher prices for…
Throughout history, many countries have repeatedly experienced large swings in asset prices, which are usually accompanied by large fluctuations in macroeconomic activity. One of the characteristics of the period before major economic…
Asset price bubbles are situations where asset prices exceed the fundamental values defined by the present value of dividends. This paper presents a conceptually new perspective: the necessity of bubbles. We establish the Bubble Necessity…
We analyze the effect of homophily in the diffusion of a harmful state between two groups of agents that differ in immunization rates. Homophily has a very different impact on the steady state infection level (that is increasing in…
We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive…
We consider the problem of rationalizing choice data by a preference satisfying an arbitrary collection of invariance axioms. Examples of such axioms include quasilinearity, homotheticity, independence-type axioms for mixture spaces,…
We introduce a framework where the announcements of a clearinghouse about the allocation process are opaque in the sense that there can be more than one outcome compatible with a realization of type reports. We ask whether desirable…
This paper studies the value of a firm's internal information when the firm faces an adverse selection problem arising from unobservable managerial abilities. While more precise information allows the firm to make ex post more efficient…
We show that Execution Tickets and Execution Auctions dramatically increase centralization in the market for block proposals, even without multi-block MEV concerns. Previous analyses have insufficiently or incorrectly modeled the…