理论经济学
We develop an Integral Transformation Method (ITM) for the study of suitable optimal control and differential game models. This allows for a solution to such dynamic problems to be found through solving a family of optimization problems…
When can interventions in markets be designed to increase surplus robustly -- i.e., with high probability -- accounting for uncertainty due to imprecise information about economic primitives? In a setting with many strategic firms, each…
I propose a model of aggregation of intervals relevant to the study of legal standards of tolerance. Seven axioms: responsiveness, anonymity, continuity, strategyproofness, and three variants of neutrality are then used to prove several…
A seller wants to sell an item to $n$ buyers. Buyer valuations are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution unknown to the seller; the seller only knows that the support is included in $[a, b]$. To be robust, the seller chooses a DSIC mechanism…
We analyze how dynamic information should be provided to uniquely implement the largest equilibrium in binary-action coordination games. The designer offers an informational put: she stays silent if players choose her preferred action, but…
A new axiom for rules for claims problems is introduced. It strengthens a condition studied in supply chain literature, which forces rules to disincentivize order inflation under capacity allocation and retail competition. The relevance of…
The relationship of policy choice by majority voting and by maximization of utilitarian welfare has long been discussed. I consider choice between a status quo and a proposed policy when persons have interpersonally comparable cardinal…
We develop a unified framework for the measurement and valuation of health and productivity. Within this framework, we characterize evaluation functions allowing for compromises between the classical quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) and…
We take an axiomatic approach to study redistribution problems when agents report income and needs. We formalize axioms reflecting ethical and operational principles such as additivity, impartiality and individual rationality. Different…
We study the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues axiomatically. Our key axiom is anonymity, the classical impartiality axiom. Other impartiality axioms already studied in these problems are equal treatment of…
The study takes the social media industry as its research subject and examines the impact of scientific innovation capabilities on profit distribution within the value chain of the social media industry. It proposes a specific solution to…
We propose a model of unawareness that remains close to the paradigm of Aumann's model for knowledge [R. J. Aumann, International Journal of Game Theory 28 (1999) 263-300]: just as Aumann uses a correspondence on a state space to define an…
We study the set of (stationary) feasible payoffs of overlapping generation repeated games that can be achieved by action sequences in which every generation of players plays the same sequence of action profiles. First, we completely…
We study monotone persuasion in the linear case, where posterior distributions over states are summarized by their mean. We solve the two leading cases where optimal unrestricted signals can be nonmonotone. First, if the objective is…
We propose a general framework of mass transport between vector-valued measures, which will be called simultaneous optimal transport (SOT). The new framework is motivated by the need to transport resources of different types simultaneously,…
The competitive pressures in China's primary and secondary education system have persisted despite decades of policy interventions aimed at reducing academic burdens and alleviating parental anxiety. This paper develops a game-theoretic…
In the problem of fully allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we show that the uniform rule is the only allocation rule that satisfies efficiency, the equal division guarantee,…
We argue that establishing the phase diagram of Agent Based Models (ABM) is a crucial first step, together with a qualitative understanding of how collective phenomena come about, before any calibration or more quantitative predictions are…
I study collective dynamic information acquisition. Players decide when to stop sequential sampling via a collective stopping rule, which specifies decisive coalitions that can terminate information acquisition upon agreement. I develop a…
Is more novel research always desirable? We develop a model in which knowledge shapes society's policies and guides the search for discoveries. Researchers select a question and how intensely to study it. The novelty of a question…