理论经济学
Macroeconomic outcomes emerge from individuals' decisions, making it essential to model how agents interact with macro policy via consumption, investment, and labor choices. We formulate this as a dynamic Stackelberg game: the government…
Consider a one-to-one two-sided matching market with workers on one side and single-position firms on the other, and suppose that the largest individually rational matching contains $n$ pairs. We show that the number of workers employed and…
Two agents trade an item in a simultaneous offer setting, where the exchange takes place if and only if the buyer's bid price weakly exceeds the seller's ask price. Each agent is randomly assigned the buyer or seller role. Both agents are…
We consider a class of economic growth models that includes the classical Ramsey--Cass--Koopmans capital accumulation model and verify that, under several assumptions, the value function of the model is the unique viscosity solution to the…
The Random Utility Model (RUM) is the leading model to represent the aggregate choices of a heterogeneous population of preference maximizers. We show that if (and only if) preferences are sufficiently uncorrelated, RUM choices can also be…
Q-learning can be described as an all-purpose automaton that provides estimates (Q-values) of the continuation values associated with each available action and follows the naive policy of almost always choosing the action with highest…
Global financial systems are undergoing strategic shifts as geopolitical tensions reshape international trade and payments. The United States (US)-China trade war, sanctions regimes, and rising concerns over the weaponization of financial…
We analyze the vulnerability of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) to speculative exploitation via their redemption mechanisms. Studying a game-theoretic model of repeated auctions for governance shares with speculators, we…
I develop a continuous-time model in which an incumbent batch-service provider faces stochastic passenger arrivals and must decide when to dispatch under the threat of customer defection to a faster entrant. The incumbent's problem is…
We show that for any $\epsilon>0$, as the number of agents gets large, the share of games that admit a pure $\epsilon$-equilibrium converges to 1. Our result holds even for pure $\epsilon$-equilibrium in which all agents, except for at most…
A weakening of sequential rationality of sequential equilibrium yields Reny's (1992) weakly sequentially rational equilibrium (WSRE) in extensive-form games. WSRE requires Kreps and Wilson's (1982) consistent assessment to satisfy global…
This paper examines the impact of cognitive biases on financial decision-making through a static Bayesian game framework. While traditional economic theory assumes fully rational investors, real-world choices are often shaped by loss…
I study robust comparative statics for risk-averse subjective expected utility (SEU) maximizers. Starting with a finite menu of actions totally ordered by sensitivity to risk, I identify the transformations of her menu that lead a…
Tournament solutions play an important role within social choice theory and the mathematical social sciences at large. We construct a tournament of order 36 for which the Banks set and the bipartisan set are disjoint. This implies that…
We demonstrate that the set of cost distributions under which the optimal strategy for maximizing compliance (or more generally, effort) in a binary choice environment is identical to the optimal strategy for maximizing the accuracy of the…
We examine the problem of assigning teachers to public schools over time when teachers have tenured positions and can work simultaneously in multiple schools. To do this, we investigate a dynamic many-to-many school choice problem where…
This study examines the dynamics of customer behavior with trial and return options in omnichannel retailing, where retailers face challenges in integrating physical and online stores. Recently, major retailers have begun offering customers…
I consider the problem of classifying individual behavior in a simple setting of outcome performativity where the behavior the algorithm seeks to classify is itself dependent on the algorithm. I show in this context that the most accurate…
This paper extends (Spear 2003) by replacing human agents with artificial intelligence (AI) entities that derive utility solely from electricity consumption. These AI agents must prepay for electricity using cryptocurrency and the…
Normal-form two-player games are categorized by players into K analogy classes so as to minimize the prediction error about the behavior of the opponent. This results in Clustered Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibria in which strategies are…