理论经济学

The linear-in-means model is the standard empirical model of peer effects. Using choice data and exogenous group variation, we first develop a revealed preference style test for the linear-in-means model. This test is formulated as a linear…

The aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function stands as a central element in the renowned Solow-Swan model in economics, providing a crucial theoretical framework for comprehending the determinants of economic growth. This model not only…

We introduce a novel equilibrium concept that incorporates Knightian uncertainty into the cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin, 2005). This concept is then applied to a two-player game in which agents can engage in trade or refuse to do so.…

Happiness, in the U.S. Declaration of Independence, was understood quite differently from today's popular notions of personal pleasure. Happiness implies a flourishing life - one of virtue, purpose, and contribution to the common good. This…

I study how a startup with uncertainty over product quality and no knowledge of the underlying diffusion network optimally chooses initial seeds. To ensure widespread adoption when the product is good while minimizing negative perceptions…

This paper examines competitive information disclosure in search markets with a mix of savvy consumers, who search costlessly, and inexperienced consumers, who face positive search costs. Savvy consumers incentivize truthful disclosure;…

Search and matching increasingly takes place on online platforms. These platforms have elements of centralized and decentralized matching; platforms can alter the search process for its users, but are unable to eliminate search frictions…

This paper presents a comprehensive formalization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility theorem using the Lean 4 interactive theorem prover. We implement the classical axioms of preference-completeness, transitivity,…

When learning from others, people tend to focus their attention on those with similar views. This is often attributed to flawed reasoning, and thought to slow learning and polarize beliefs. However, we show that echo chambers are a rational…

B\'eal et al. (Int J Game Theory 54, 2025) introduce the Diversity Owen value for TU-games with diversity constraints, and provide axiomatic characterizations using the axioms of fairness and balanced contributions. However, there exist…

Individuals increasingly rely on social networking platforms to form opinions. However, these platforms typically aim to maximize engagement, which may not align with social good. In this paper, we introduce an opinion dynamics model where…

Individuals often navigate several options with incomplete knowledge of their own preferences. Information provisioning tools such as public rankings and personalized recommendations have become central to helping individuals make choices,…

I conduct Rabin's (2000) calibration exercise in the subjective expected utility realm. I show that the rejection of some risky bet by a risk-averse agent only implies the rejection of more extreme and less desirable bets and nothing more.

We provide optimal solutions to an institution that has distributional objectives when choosing from a set of applications based on merit (or priority). For example, in college admissions, administrators may want to admit a diverse class in…

The main purpose of this paper is to generalize some recent results obtained by Chilarescu and Manuel Gomez. Essentially, we are trying to study the effect of elasticity of substitution on the parameters of economic growth, based on its two…

We revisit DeGroot learning to examine the robustness of social learning in dynamic networks -- networks that evolve randomly over time. Dynamics have double-edged effects depending on social structure: while they can foster consensus and…

We develop a simple framework to analyze how targeted persuasive advertising shapes market power and welfare. A designer flexibly manipulates the demand curve by influencing individual valuations at a cost. A monopolist prices against this…

This paper studies a model of technology adoption: a manager tries to induce a group of workers to exert costly effort to vet a new technology before they choose whether to use it. The manager finds it too costly to simultaneously replace…

Macroeconomic outcomes emerge from individuals' decisions, making it essential to model how agents interact with macro policy via consumption, investment, and labor choices. We formulate this as a dynamic Stackelberg game: the government…

Consider a one-to-one two-sided matching market with workers on one side and single-position firms on the other, and suppose that the largest individually rational matching contains $n$ pairs. We show that the number of workers employed and…