理论经济学
We consider social learning in a changing world. Society can remain responsive to state changes only if agents regularly act upon fresh information, which limits the value of social learning. When the state is close to persistent, a…
We study the mechanism design problem of selling a public good to a group of agents by a principal in the correlated private value environment. We assume the principal only knows the expectations of the agents' values, but does not know the…
The theory of full implementation has been criticized for using integer/modulo games which admit no equilibrium (Jackson (1992)). To address the critique, we revisit the classical Nash implementation problem due to Maskin (1999) but allow…
We study a class of preference domains that satisfies the familiar properties of minimal richness, diversity and no-restoration. We show that a specific preference restriction, hybridness, has been embedded in these domains so that the…
We present the equivalence between the fuzzy core and the core under minimal assumptions. Due to the exact version of the Lyapunov convexity theorem in Banach spaces, we clarify that the additional structure of commodity spaces and…
We study a game where households convert paper assets, such as money, into consumption goods, to preempt inflation. The game features a unique equilibrium with high (low) inflation, if money supply is high (low). For intermediate levels of…
We consider dynamic stochastic economies with heterogeneous agents and introduce the concept of uniformly self-justified equilibria (USJE) -- temporary equilibria for which forecasts are best uniform approximations to a selection of the…
In this discussion draft, we explore heterogeneous oligopoly games of increasing players with quadratic costs, where the market is supposed to have the isoelastic demand. For each of the models considered in this draft, we analytically…
We provide an analysis of the recent work by Malaney-Weinstein on "Economics as Gauge Theory" presented on November 10, 2021 at the Money and Banking Workshop hosted by University of Chicago. In particular, we distill the technical…
It is well-known that subjective beliefs cannot be identified with traditional choice data unless we impose the strong assumption that preferences are state-independent. This is seen as one of the biggest pitfalls of incentivized belief…
Since 1950, India has been implementing the most comprehensive affirmative action program in the world. Vertical reservations are provided to members of historically discriminated Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), and Other…
We characterize the shape of spatial externalities in a continuous time and space differential game with transboundary pollution. We posit a realistic spatiotemporal law of motion for pollution (diffusion and advection), and tackle…
This paper considers a class of experimentation games with L\'{e}vy bandits encompassing those of Bolton and Harris (1999) and Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005). Its main result is that efficient (perfect Bayesian) equilibria exist whenever…
In this paper, a relation between shadow price and the Lagrangian multiplier for nonsmooth problem is explored. It is shown that the Lagrangian Multiplier is the upper bound of shadow price for convex optimization and a class of Lipschtzian…
We design the insurance contract when the insurer faces arson-type risks. The optimal contract must be manipulation-proof. It is therefore continuous, it has a bounded slope, and it satisfies the no-sabotage condition when arson-type…
This article examines differentiability properties of the value function of positioning choice problems, a class of optimisation problems in finite-dimensional Euclidean spaces. We show that positioning choice problems' value function is…
We examine the trade-off between the provision of incentives to exert costly effort (ex-ante moral hazard) and the incentives needed to prevent the agent from manipulating the profit observed by the principal (ex-post moral hazard).…
We study whether a planner can robustly implement a state-contingent social choice function when (i) agents must incur a cost to learn the state and (ii) the planner faces uncertainty regarding agents' preferences over outcomes, information…
A monopolist wants to sell one item per period to a consumer with evolving and persistent private information. The seller sets a price each period depending on the history so far, but cannot commit to future prices. We show that, regardless…
In statistical decision theory, a model is said to be Pareto optimal (or admissible) if no other model carries less risk for at least one state of nature while presenting no more risk for others. How can you rationally aggregate/combine a…