理论经济学
In this paper, we propose a model of the marriage market in which individuals meet potential partners either directly or through their friends. When socialization is exogenous, a higher arrival rate of direct meetings also implies more…
Game dynamics structure (e.g., endogenous cycle motion) in human subjects game experiments can be predicted by game dynamics theory. However, whether the structure can be controlled by mechanism design to a desired goal is not known. Here,…
This note analyzes the outcome equivalence conditions of two popular affirmative action policies, majority quota and minority reserve, under the student optimal stable mechanism. These two affirmative actions generate an identical matching…
In this paper, we investigate how the COVID-19 pandemics and more precisely the lockdown of a sector of the economy may have changed our habits and, there-fore, altered the demand of some goods even after the re-opening. In a two-sector…
In a many-to-one matching model in which firms' preferences satisfy substitutability, we study the set of worker-quasi-stable matchings. Worker-quasi-stability is a relaxation of stability that allows blocking pairs involving a firm and an…
A well-intentioned principal provides information to a rationally inattentive agent without internalizing the agent's cost of processing information. Whatever information the principal makes available, the agent may choose to ignore some.…
For object reallocation problems, if preferences are strict but otherwise unrestricted, the Top Trading Cycles rule (TTC) is the leading rule: It is the only rule satisfying efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness.…
For a many-to-one matching model, we study the matchings obtained through the restabilization of stable matchings that had been disrupted by a change in the population. We include a simple representation of the stable matching obtained in…
We investigate the implementation of reduced-form allocation probabilities in a two-person bargaining problem without side payments, where the agents have to select one alternative from a finite set of social alternatives. We provide a…
We consider a combinatorial auction model where preferences of agents over bundles of objects and payments need not be quasilinear. However, we restrict the preferences of agents to be dichotomous. An agent with dichotomous preference…
It is well-known that optimal (i.e., revenue-maximizing) selling mechanisms in multidimensional type spaces may involve randomization. We obtain conditions under which deterministic mechanisms are optimal for selling two identical,…
We study bilateral trade with interdependent values as an informed-principal problem. The mechanism-selection game has multiple equilibria that differ with respect to principal's payoff and trading surplus. We characterize the equilibrium…
This exercise proposes a learning mechanism to model economic agent's decision-making process using an actor-critic structure in the literature of artificial intelligence. It is motivated by the psychology literature of learning through…
This paper studies a search problem where a consumer is initially aware of only a few products. At every point in time, the consumer then decides between searching among alternatives he is already aware of and discovering more products. I…
We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the (possibly…
The commitment power of senders distinguishes Bayesian persuasion problems from other games with (strategic) communication. Persuasion games with multiple senders have largely studied simultaneous commitment and signalling settings.…
Motivated by online advertising auctions, we study auction design in repeated auctions played by simple Artificial Intelligence algorithms (Q-learning). We find that first-price auctions with no additional feedback lead to tacit-collusive…
We study how a consensus emerges in a finite population of like-minded individuals who are asymmetrically informed about the realization of the true state of the world. Agents observe a private signal about the state and then start…
Knoblauch (2014) and Knoblauch (2015) investigate the relative size of the collection of binary relations with desirable features as compared to the set of all binary relations using symmetric difference metric (Cantor) topology and…
We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions, i.e., we offer a complete answer regarding what social choice functions can be rationalizably implemented.