理论经济学
A natural notion of rationality/consistency for aggregating models is that, for all (possibly aggregated) models $A$ and $B$, if the output of model $A$ is $f(A)$ and if the output model $B$ is $f(B)$, then the output of the model obtained…
We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for dynamic mechanism-selection games in which the designer can only commit to short-term mechanisms. We identify a canonical class of mechanisms rich enough to replicate the outcomes of…
In this paper, we show that when policy-motivated parties can commit to a particular platform during a uni-dimensional electoral contest where valence issues do not arise there must be a positive association between the policies preferred…
In the classical Bayesian persuasion model an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. The informed player, the sender, knows the state of nature, while the uninformed one, the receiver, does not. The informed…
In this paper, I introduce a profit-maximizing centralized marketplace into a decentralized market with search frictions. Agents choose between the centralized marketplace and the decentralized bilateral trade. I characterize the optimal…
Convertible instruments are contracts, used in venture financing, which give investors the right to receive shares in the venture in certain circumstances. In liquidity events, investors may have the option to either receive back their…
We consider a Bayesian persuasion or information design problem where the sender tries to persuade the receiver to take a particular action via a sequence of signals. This we model by considering multi-phase trials with different…
Law enforcement acquires costly evidence with the aim of securing the conviction of a defendant, who is convicted if a decision-maker's belief exceeds a certain threshold. Either law enforcement or the decision-maker is biased and is…
Dworczak et al. (2021) study when certain market structures are optimal in the presence of heterogeneous preferences. A key assumption is that the social planner knows the joint distribution of the value of the good and marginal value of…
We analyse 'stop-and-go' containment policies that produce infection cycles as periods of tight lockdowns are followed by periods of falling infection rates. The subsequent relaxation of containment measures allows cases to increase again…
We extend Berge's Maximum Theorem to allow for incomplete preferences. We first provide a simple version of the Maximum Theorem for convex feasible sets and a fixed preference. Then, we show that if, in addition to the traditional…
Humans exhibit irrational decision-making patterns in response to environmental triggers, such as experiencing an economic loss or gain. In this paper we investigate whether algorithms exhibit the same behavior by examining the observed…
This paper demonstrates the additive and multiplicative version of a long-run law of unexpected shocks for any economic variable. We derive these long-run laws by the martingale theory without relying on the stationary and ergodic…
We examine the surplus extraction problem in a mechanism design setting with behavioral types. In our model behavioral types always perfectly reveal their private information. We characterize the sufficient conditions that guarantee full…
This study investigates a potential mechanism to promote coordination. With theoretical guidance using a belief-based learning model, we conduct a multi-period, binary-choice, and weakest-link laboratory coordination experiment to study the…
A textbook chapter on modeling choice behavior and designing institutional choice functions for matching and market design. The chapter is to appear in: Online and Matching-Based Market Design. Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica and Vijay…
Govindan and Klumpp [7] provided a characterization of perfect equilibria using Lexicographic Probability Systems (LPSs). Their characterization was essentially finite in that they showed that there exists a finite bound on the number of…
In this paper I investigate a Bayesian inverse problem in the specific setting of a price setting monopolist facing a randomly growing demand in multiple possibly interconnected markets. Investigating the Value of Information of a signal to…
Hysteresis is treated as a history dependent branching, and the use of the classical Preisach model for the analysis of macroeconomic hysteresis is first discussed. Then, a new Preisach-type model is introduced as a macroeconomic…
A seller with one unit of a good faces N\geq3 buyers and a single competitor who sells one other identical unit in a second-price auction with a reserve price. Buyers who do not get the seller's good will compete in the competitor's…