计算机科学与博弈论
Schelling games model the wide-spread phenomenon of residential segregation in metropolitan areas from a game-theoretic point of view. In these games agents of different types each strategically select a node on a given graph that models…
We study a natural combinatorial pricing problem for sequentially arriving buyers with equal budgets. Each buyer is interested in exactly one pair of items and purchases this pair if and only if, upon arrival, both items are still available…
Approval-based committee (ABC) voting rules elect a fixed size subset of the candidates, a so-called committee, based on the voters' approval ballots over the candidates. While these rules have recently attracted significant attention,…
Prophet inequalities for rewards maximization are fundamental to optimal stopping theory with extensive applications to mechanism design and online optimization. We study the \emph{cost minimization} counterpart of the classical prophet…
We formalize a framework for coordinating funding and selecting projects, the costs of which are shared among agents with quasi-linear utility functions and individual budgets. Our model contains the classical discrete participatory…
To overcome incompatibility issues, kidney patients may swap their donors. In international kidney exchange programmes (IKEPs), countries merge their national patient-donor pools. We consider a recently introduced credit system. In each…
The sequence of moves in a dynamic team tournament may distort the ex-ante winning probabilities and harm efficiency. This paper compares seven soccer penalty shootout rules that determine the kicking order, from a theoretical perspective.…
We study the problem of dividing indivisible chores among agents whose costs (for the chores) are supermodular set functions with binary marginals. Such functions capture complementarity among chores, i.e., they constitute an expressive…
Founded in 2017, Algorand is one of the world's first carbon-negative, public blockchains inspired by proof of stake. Algorand uses a Byzantine agreement protocol to add new blocks to the blockchain. The protocol can tolerate malicious…
Crowdsourcing is a favorable computing paradigm for processing computer-hard tasks by harnessing human intelligence. However, generic crowdsourcing systems may lead to privacy-leakage through the sharing of worker data. To tackle this…
In this article we analyze a partial-information Nash Q-learning algorithm for a general 2-player stochastic game. Partial information refers to the setting where a player does not know the strategy or the actions taken by the opposing…
In each round of a Swiss-system tournament, players of similar score are paired against each other. An intentional early loss therefore might lead to weaker opponents in later rounds and thus to a better final tournament result - a…
To address the dynamic nature of real-world networks, we generalize competitive diffusion games and Voronoi games from static to temporal graphs, where edges may appear or disappear over time. This establishes a new direction of studies in…
Selection under category or diversity constraints is a ubiquitous and widely-applicable problem that is encountered in immigration, school choice, hiring, and healthcare rationing. These diversity constraints are typically represented by…
We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-games, and its specific instantiation as the competitive…
Recent works of Roughgarden (EC'21) and Chung and Shi (SODA'23) initiate the study of a new decentralized mechanism design problem called transaction fee mechanism design (TFM). Unlike the classical mechanism design literature, in the…
In mechanism design, it is challenging to design the optimal auction with correlated values in general settings. Although value distribution can be further exploited to improve revenue, the complex correlation structure makes it hard to…
We study the problem of dynamically allocating $T$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with the restriction that the allocation is fair all the time. Due to the negative results to achieve fairness when allocations are irrevocable, we allow…
We introduce a family of normative principles to assess fairness in the context of participatory budgeting. These principles are based on the fundamental idea that budget allocations should be fair in terms of the resources invested into…
We prove that a deterministic n-person shortest path game has a Nash equlibrium in pure and stationary strategies if it is edge-symmetric (that is (u,v) is a move whenever (v,u) is, apart from moves entering terminal vertices) and the…