计算机科学与博弈论

This paper deals with two-sided matching market with two disjoint sets, i.e. the set of buyers and the set of sellers. Each seller can trade with at most with one buyer and vice versa. Money is transferred from sellers to buyers for an…

We study the problem of social welfare maximization in bilateral trade, where two agents, a buyer and a seller, trade an indivisible item. We consider arguably the simplest form of mechanisms -- the fixed-price mechanisms, where the…

In 1975 the first author proved that every finite tight two-person game form $g$ is Nash-solvable, that is, for every payoffs $u$ and $w$ of two players the obtained game $(g;u,w)$, in normal form, has a Nash equilibrium (NE) in pure…

We study a pricing problem where a seller has $k$ identical copies of a product, buyers arrive sequentially, and the seller prices the items aiming to maximize social welfare. When $k=1$, this is the so called "prophet inequality" problem…

We consider finite two-person normal form games. The following four properties of their game forms are equivalent: (i) Nash-solvability, (ii) zero-sum-solvability, (iii) win-lose-solvability, and (iv) tightness. For (ii, iii, iv) this was…

In dynamic mechanism design literature, one critical aspect has been typically ignored-the agents' periodic participation, which they can adapt and plan strategically. We propose a framework for dynamic principal-multiagent problems,…

In digital online advertising, advertisers procure ad impressions simultaneously on multiple platforms, or so-called channels, such as Google Ads, Meta Ads Manager, etc., each of which consists of numerous ad auctions. We study how an…

Online advertising channels have commonly focused on maximizing total advertiser value (or welfare) to enhance long-run retention and channel healthiness. Previous literature has studied auction design by incorporating machine learning…

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency…

Selecting influentials in networks against strategic manipulations has attracted many researchers' attention and it also has many practical applications. Here, we aim to select one or two influentials in terms of progeny (the influential…

In online advertising markets, budget-constrained advertisers acquire ad placements through repeated bidding in auctions on various platforms. We present a strategy for bidding optimally in a set of auctions that may or may not be…

To take advantage of strategy commitment, a useful tactic of playing games, a leader must learn enough information about the follower's payoff function. However, this leaves the follower a chance to provide fake information and influence…

In the context of reducing carbon emissions in the automotive supply chain, collaboration between vehicle manufacturers and retailers has proven to be an effective measure for enhancing carbon emission reduction within the enterprise. This…

Ensuring the security of networked systems is a significant problem, considering the susceptibility of modern infrastructures and technologies to adversarial interference. A central component of this problem is how defensive resources…

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for \emph{information acquisition} scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed \emph{receiver} and a set of informed \emph{senders}. In our model the senders…

We study the parameterized complexity of winner determination problems for three prevalent $k$-committee selection rules, namely the minimax approval voting (MAV), the proportional approval voting (PAV), and the Chamberlin-Courant's…

The $1-N$ generalized Stackelberg game (single-leader multi-follower game) is intricately intertwined with the interaction between a leader and followers (hierarchical interaction) and the interaction among followers (simultaneous…

For a federated learning model to perform well, it is crucial to have a diverse and representative dataset. However, the data contributors may only be concerned with the performance on a specific subset of the population, which may not…

In this paper, we introduce a generalization of the standard Stackelberg Games (SGs) framework: Calibrated Stackelberg Games (CSGs). In CSGs, a principal repeatedly interacts with an agent who (contrary to standard SGs) does not have direct…

Leveraging tools from the study of linear fractional transformations and algebraic Riccati equations, a local characterization of consistent conjectural variations equilibrium is given for two player games on continuous action spaces with…