计算机科学与博弈论

We study repeated first-price auctions and general repeated Bayesian games between two players, where one player, the learner, employs a no-regret learning algorithm, and the other player, the optimizer, knowing the learner's algorithm,…

To allocate transactions to blocks, cryptocurrencies use an auction-like transaction fee mechanism (TFM). A conjecture of Roughgarden [44] asks whether there is a TFM that is incentive compatible for both the users and the miner, and is…

Normal-form games (NFGs) are the fundamental model of strategic interaction. We study their representation using neural networks. We describe the inherent equivariance of NFGs -- any permutation of strategies describes an equivalent game --…

Bounded rationality in mechanism design aims to ensure incentive-compatibility for agents who are cognitively limited. These agents lack the contingent reasoning skills that traditional mechanism design assumes, and depending on how these…

We study Bayesian persuasion under approximate best response, where the receiver may choose any action that is not too much suboptimal given their posterior belief upon receiving the signal. We focus on the computational aspects of the…

In many situations when people are assigned to coalitions, the utility of each person depends on the friends in her coalition. Additionally, in many situations, the size of each coalition should be bounded. This paper studies such coalition…

In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the…

We study stochastic zero-sum games on graphs, which are prevalent tools to model decision-making in presence of an antagonistic opponent in a random environment. In this setting, an important question is the one of strategy complexity: what…

What payoffs are positionally determined for deterministic two-player antagonistic games on finite directed graphs? In this paper we study this question for payoffs that are continuous. The main reason why continuous positionally determined…

We consider the problem of computing Nash equilibria in potential games where each player's strategy set is subject to private uncoupled constraints. This scenario is frequently encountered in real-world applications like road network…

This paper considers a class of noncooperative games in which the feasible decision sets of all players are coupled together by a coupled inequality constraint. Adopting the variational inequality formulation of the game, we first introduce…

Online platforms, including social media and search platforms, have routinely used their users' data for targeted ads, to improve their services, and to sell to third-party buyers. But an increasing awareness of the importance of users'…

We study incentive designs for a class of stochastic Stackelberg games with one leader and a large number of (finite as well as infinite population of) followers. We investigate whether the leader can craft a strategy under a dynamic…

In today's online advertising markets, it is common for advertisers to set long-term budgets. Correspondingly, advertising platforms adopt budget control methods to ensure that advertisers' payments lie within their budgets. Most budget…

In this paper we introduce and analyse, from a game theoretical perspective, several multi-agent or multi-item continuous review inventory models in which the buyers are exempted from ordering costs if the price of their orders is greater…

In this paper, we study how to optimize existing Non-Fungible Token (NFT) incentives. Upon exploring a large number of NFT-related standards and real-world projects, we come across an unexpected finding. That is, the current NFT incentive…

Based on Holler (1982) and Armijos-Toro et al. (2021) we propose two power indices to measure the influence of the players in the class of weighted majority games in partition function form. We compare these new power indices with their…

In this paper, we introduce a notion of mergeable weighted majority games with the aim of providing the first characterization of the Colomer-Mart\'inez power index (Colomer and Mart\'inez in J Theor Polit 7(1):41-63, 1995). Furthermore, we…

Recently a growing literature study a new forecast aggregation setting where each forecaster is additionally asked ``what's your expectation for the average of other forecasters' forecasts?''. However, most theoretic results in this setting…

Floors (also known as reserve prices) help publishers to increase the expected revenue of their ad space, which is usually sold via auctions. Floors are defined as the minimum bid that a seller (it can be a publisher or an ad exchange) is…