计算机科学与博弈论

We study the computational complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price auctions with discrete value distributions and discrete bidding space, under general subjective beliefs. It is known that such auctions do not always…

This work proposes a novel set of techniques for approximating a Nash equilibrium in a finite, normal-form game. It achieves this by constructing a new reformulation as solving a parameterized system of multivariate polynomials with tunable…

The widespread use of e-bikes has facilitated short-distance travel yet led to confusion and safety problems in road traffic. This study focuses on the dual characteristics of e-bikes in traffic conflicts: they resemble pedestrians when…

We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions. Envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) is a well-studied fairness notion for indivisible goods, while Pareto optimality…

A celebrated connection in the interface of online learning and game theory establishes that players minimizing swap regret converge to correlated equilibria (CE) -- a seminal game-theoretic solution concept. Despite the long history of…

A celebrated result in the interface of online learning and game theory guarantees that the repeated interaction of no-regret players leads to a coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) -- a natural game-theoretic solution concept. Despite the…

Extensive-Form Game (EFG) represents a fundamental model for analyzing sequential interactions among multiple agents and the primary challenge to solve it lies in mitigating sample complexity. Existing research indicated that Double Oracle…

In this study, we propose the polyhedral clinching auction for indivisible goods, which has so far been studied for divisible goods. As in the divisible setting by Goel et al. (2015), our mechanism enjoys incentive compatibility, individual…

We address auctions in two-sided markets with budget constraints on buyers, a fundamental setting also crucial for applications such as display advertising. Our goal is to design efficient mechanisms that satisfy dominant strategy incentive…

In the area of matching-based market design, existing models using cardinal utilities suffer from two deficiencies: First, the Hylland-Zeckhauser (HZ) mechanism, which has remained a classic in economics for one-sided matching markets, is…

Multiwinner voting rules can be used to select a fixed-size committee from a larger set of candidates. We consider approval-based committee rules, which allow voters to approve or disapprove candidates. In this setting, several voting rules…

Consider a principal who wants to search through a space of stochastic solutions for one maximizing their utility. If the principal cannot conduct this search on their own, they may instead delegate this problem to an agent with distinct…

Fairness and efficiency have become the pillars of modern fair division research, but prior work on achieving both simultaneously is largely limited to the unconstrained setting. We study fair and efficient allocations of indivisible goods…

On User-Generated Content (UGC) platforms, recommendation algorithms significantly impact creators' motivation to produce content as they compete for algorithmically allocated user traffic. This phenomenon subtly shapes the volume and…

Agricultural industries face increasing pressure to optimize efficiency and reduce costs in a competitive and resource-constrained global market. As firms seek innovative ways to enhance productivity, cooperative strategies have emerged as…

How to optimally persuade an agent who has a private type? When elicitation is feasible, this amounts to a fairly standard principal-agent-style mechanism design problem, where the persuader employs a mechanism to first elicit the agent's…

We study fair allocation of indivisible chores to agents under budget constraints, where each chore has an objective size and disutility. This model captures scenarios where a set of chores need to be divided among agents with limited time,…

In this paper, we extend the museum pass problem to incorporate the market structure. To be more precise, we consider that museums are organized into several pass programs or consortia. Within this framework, we propose four allocation…

The apportionment problem constitutes a fundamental problem in democratic societies: How to distribute a fixed number of seats among a set of states in proportion to the states' populations? This--seemingly simple--task has led to a rich…

We study temporal fair division, whereby a set of agents are allocated a (possibly different) set of goods on each day for a period of days. We study this setting, as well as a number of its special cases formed by the restrictions to two…