Related papers: Cost Allocation for Set Covering: the Happy Nucleo…
We introduce the subset assignment problem in which items of varying sizes are placed in a set of bins with limited capacity. Items can be replicated and placed in any subset of the bins. Each (item, subset) pair has an associated cost. Not…
This paper addresses the optimization problem to maximize the total costs that can be shared among a group of agents, while maintaining stability in the sense of the core constraints of a cooperative transferable utility game, or TU game.…
We revisit the coalition structure generation problem in which the goal is to partition the players into exhaustive and disjoint coalitions so as to maximize the social welfare. One of our key results is a general polynomial-time algorithm…
We provide an efficient algorithm for computing the nucleolus for an instance of a weighted cooperative matching game. This resolves a long-standing open question posed in [Faigle, Kern, Fekete, Hochst\"{a}ttler, Mathematical Programming,…
The game of SET is a popular card game in which the objective is to form Sets using cards from a special deck. In this paper we study single- and multi-round variations of this game from the computational complexity point of view and…
The potential harms of algorithmic decisions have ignited algorithmic fairness as a central topic in computer science. One of the fundamental problems in computer science is Set Cover, which has numerous applications with societal impacts,…
We provide an algorithm for computing the nucleolus for an instance of a weighted voting game in pseudo-polynomial time. This resolves an open question posed by Elkind. et.al. 2007.
The Reward-Penalty-Selection Problem (RPSP) can be seen as a combination of the Set Cover Problem (SCP) and the Hitting Set Problem (HSP). Given a set of elements, a set of reward sets, and a set of penalty sets, one tries to find a subset…
We investigate flow games featuring both private arcs owned by individual players and public arcs accessible cost-free to all coalitions. We explore two solution concepts within this framework: the approximate core and the nucleon. The…
We study the optimization version of the set partition problem (where the difference between the partition sums are minimized), which has numerous applications in decision theory literature. While the set partitioning problem is NP-hard and…
In this paper we challenge the widely accepted premise that, in order to carry out a distributed computation, say on the cloud, users have to inform, along with all the inputs that the algorithm in use requires, the number of processors to…
In this paper we consider strategic cost sharing games with so-called arbitrary sharing based on various combinatorial optimization problems, such as vertex and set cover, facility location, and network design problems. We concentrate on…
Partial set cover problem and set multi-cover problem are two generalizations of set cover problem. In this paper, we consider the partial set multi-cover problem which is a combination of them: given an element set $E$, a collection of…
In this paper, we consider the weighted online set k-multicover problem. In this problem, we have a universe V of elements, a family S of subsets of V with a positive real cost for every set in S and a "coverage factor" (positive integer)…
Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable profit distribution in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on path cooperative games that arise from the situations where some commodity…
Policy makers focus on stable strategies as the ones adopted by rational players. If there are many such solutions an important question is how to select amongst them. We study this question for the Multicommodity Flow Coalition Game, used…
We present a general framework to model strategic aspects and stable and fair resource allocations in networks via variants and generalizations of path coalitional games. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if it…
The problem of dividing resources fairly occurs in many practical situations and is therefore an important topic of study in economics. In this paper, we investigate envy-free divisions in the setting where there are multiple players in…
The problem of designing a profit-maximizing, Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism with flexible consumers and costly heterogeneous supply is considered. In our setup, each consumer is associated with a…
We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria Stackelberg games whose underlying structure is in congestion games, focusing on the case where each player can choose a single resource (a.k.a. singleton congestion games) and one of…