Related papers: Cost Allocation for Set Covering: the Happy Nucleo…
This paper proposes a change in perspective on the ``transformation of values'' problem: from ``searching for a single constant solution'' to ``characterizing the allocation space under objective constraints imposed by the physical…
We study the computational complexity of fair division of indivisible items in an enriched model: there is an underlying graph on the set of items. And we have to allocate the items (i.e., the vertices of the graph) to a set of agents in…
Our goal in this paper is to automatically extract a set of decision rules (rule set) that best explains a classification data set. First, a large set of decision rules is extracted from a set of decision trees trained on the data set. The…
We consider the fair allocation of indivisible items to several agents with additional conflict constraints. These are represented by a conflict graph where each item corresponds to a vertex of the graph and edges in the graph represent…
We study combinatorial auctions where each item is sold separately but simultaneously via a second price auction. We ask whether it is possible to efficiently compute in this game a pure Nash equilibrium with social welfare close to the…
In many applications, we want to influence the decisions of independent agents by designing incentives for their actions. We revisit a fundamental problem in this area, called GAME IMPLEMENTATION: Given a game in standard form and a set of…
Selection of a group of representatives satisfying certain fairness constraints, is a commonly occurring scenario. Motivated by this, we initiate a systematic algorithmic study of a \emph{fair} version of \textsc{Hitting Set}. In the…
We consider extension variants of the classical graph problems Vertex Cover and Independent Set. Given a graph $G=(V,E)$ and a vertex set $U \subseteq V$, it is asked if there exists a minimal vertex cover (resp.\ maximal independent set)…
This study introduces a novel framework to model cost overruns associated with four key stakeholders in nuclear power plant construction: equipment suppliers, construction subcontractors, the design and management team, and creditors. The…
Numerous algorithms have been produced for the fundamental problem of clustering under many different notions of fairness. Perhaps the most common family of notions currently studied is group fairness, in which proportional group…
Consider a very simple class of (finite) games: after an initial move by nature, each player makes one move. Moreover, the players have common interests: at each node, all the players get the same payoff. We show that the problem of…
In the dynamic set cover (SC) problem, the input is a dynamic universe of at most $n$ elements and a fixed collection of $m$ sets, where each element belongs to at most $f$ sets and each set has cost in $[1/C, 1]$. The objective is to…
We study the computational complexity of finding stable outcomes in hedonic games, which are a class of coalition formation games. We restrict our attention to symmetric additively-separable hedonic games, which are a nontrivial subclass of…
While graphs and abstract data structures can be large and complex, practical instances are often regular or highly structured. If the instance has sufficient structure, we might hope to compress the object into a more succinct…
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of…
We consider game-theoretically secure distributed protocols for coalition games that approximate the Shapley value with small multiplicative error. Since all known existing approximation algorithms for the Shapley value are randomized, it…
We consider item allocation to individual agents who have additive valuations, in settings in which there are protected groups, and the allocation needs to give each protected group its "fair" share of the total welfare. Informally, within…
We introduce the Byzantine Selection Problem, living at the intersection of game theory and fault-tolerant distributed computing. Here, an event organizer is presented with a group of $n$ agents, and wants to select $\ell < n$ of them to…
We consider the problem of allocating a set on indivisible items to players with private preferences in an efficient and fair way. We focus on valuations that have dichotomous marginals, in which the added value of any item to a set is…
We study stable matching problems in networks where players are embedded in a social context, and may incorporate friendship relations or altruism into their decisions. Each player is a node in a social network and strives to form a good…