Related papers: How to choose a Compatible Committee?
The Shapley-Shubik index is a specialization of the Shapley value and is widely applied to evaluate the power distribution in committees drawing binary decisions. It was generalized to decisions with more than two levels of approval both in…
A solution function for convex transferable utility games encourages the grand coalition if no player prefers (in a precise sense defined in the text) any coalition to the grand coalition. We show that the Shapley value encourages the grand…
We study the committee selection problem in the canonical impartial culture model with a large number of voters and an even larger candidate set. Here, each voter independently reports a uniformly random preference order over the…
Multi-agent reinforcement learning is an area of rapid advancement in artificial intelligence and machine learning. One of the important questions to be answered is how to conduct credit assignment in a multi-agent system. There have been…
We present an alternative voting system that aims at bridging the gap between proportional representative systems and majoritarian, single winner election systems. The system lets people vote for multiple parties, but then assigns each…
The Chamberlin-Courant and Monroe rules are fundamental and well-studied rules in the literature of multi-winner elections. The problem of determining if there exists a committee of size k that has a Chamberlin-Courant (respectively,…
In many multi-agent settings, participants can form teams to achieve collective outcomes that may far surpass their individual capabilities. Measuring the relative contributions of agents and allocating them shares of the reward that…
We extend Approval voting to the settings where voters may have intransitive preferences. The major obstacle to applying Approval voting in these settings is that voters are not able to clearly determine who they should approve or…
Multi-winner voting plays a crucial role in selecting representative committees based on voter preferences. Previous research has predominantly focused on single-stage voting rules, which are susceptible to manipulation during preference…
A new game-theoretic approach for combining multiple classifiers is proposed. A short introduction in Game Theory and coalitions illustrate the way any collective decision scheme can be viewed as a competitive game of coalitions that are…
We study the complexity of deciding whether there is a tie in a given approval-based multiwinner election, as well as the complexity of counting tied winning committees. We consider a family of Thiele rules, their greedy variants,…
A quantitative assessment of the global importance of an agent in a team is as valuable as gold for strategists, decision-makers, and sports coaches. Yet, retrieving this information is not trivial since in a cooperative task it is hard to…
We study a game-theoretic model for pool formation in Proof of Stake blockchain protocols. In such systems, stakeholders can form pools as a means of obtaining regular rewards from participation in ledger maintenance, with the power of each…
We investigate how robust approval-based multiwinner voting rules are to small perturbations in the votes. In particular, we consider the extent to which a committee can change after we add/remove/swap one approval, and we consider the…
The Reward-Penalty-Selection Problem (RPSP) can be seen as a combination of the Set Cover Problem (SCP) and the Hitting Set Problem (HSP). Given a set of elements, a set of reward sets, and a set of penalty sets, one tries to find a subset…
The Shapley value has become popular in the Explainable AI (XAI) literature, thanks, to a large extent, to a solid theoretical foundation, including four "favourable and fair" axioms for attribution in transferable utility games. The…
In this dissertation, we analyze the computational properties of game-theoretic centrality measures. The key idea behind game-theoretic approach to network analysis is to treat nodes as players in a cooperative game, where the value of each…
Multi-winner approval-based voting has received considerable attention recently. A voting rule in this setting takes as input ballots in which each agent approves a subset of the available alternatives and outputs a committee of…
Voting is a very general method of preference aggregation. A voting rule takes as input every voter's vote (typically, a ranking of the alternatives), and produces as output either just the winning alternative or a ranking of the…
Lloyd Shapley's cooperative value allocation theory stands as a central concept in game theory, extensively utilized across various domains to distribute resources, evaluate individual contributions, and ensure fairness. The Shapley value…