Related papers: How to choose a Compatible Committee?
We consider the following problem in which a given number of items has to be chosen from a predefined set. Each item is described by a vector of attributes and for each attribute there is a desired distribution that the selected set should…
In the committee selection problem, the goal is to choose a subset of size $k$ from a set of candidates $C$ that collectively gives the best representation to a set of voters. We consider this problem in Euclidean $d$-space where each…
Cooperative games provide a framework to study cooperation among self-interested agents. They offer a number of solution concepts describing how the outcome of the cooperation should be shared among the players. Unfortunately, computational…
A variety of recent papers discuss the application of Shapley values, a concept for explaining coalitional games, for feature attribution in machine learning. However, the correct way to connect a machine learning model to a coalitional…
We develop a model of multiwinner elections that combines performance-based measures of the quality of the committee (such as, e.g., Borda scores of the committee members) with diversity constraints. Specifically, we assume that the…
The latest developments in AI focus on agentic systems where artificial and human agents cooperate to realize global goals. An example is collaborative learning, which aims to train a global model based on data from individual agents. A…
We study approval-based committee voting in which a target number of candidates are selected based on voters' approval preferences over candidates. In contrast to most of the work, we consider the setting where voters express uncertain…
In this paper, we propose a family of approval voting-schemes for electing committees based on the preferences of voters. In our schemes, we calculate the vector of distances of the possible committees from each of the ballots and, for a…
Coalitional voting games appear in different forms in multi-agent systems, social choice and threshold logic. In this paper, the complexity of comparison of influence between players in coalitional voting games is characterized. The…
We study the Shapley value in weighted voting games. The Shapley value has been used as an index for measuring the power of individual agents in decision-making bodies and political organizations, where decisions are made by a majority vote…
We investigate how robust the results of committee elections are to small changes in the input preference orders, depending on the voting rules used. We find that for typical rules the effect of making a single swap of adjacent candidates…
Shapley value is a concept in cooperative game theory for measuring the contribution of each participant, which was named in honor of Lloyd Shapley. Shapley value has been recently applied in data marketplaces for compensation allocation…
Committee selection with diversity or distributional constraints is a ubiquitous problem. However, many of the formal approaches proposed so far have certain drawbacks including (1) computationally intractability in general, and (2)…
We study the problem of minimizing metric distortion in multi-winner elections, where a committee of size $k$ is selected from a set of candidates based on voters' ordinal preferences. We assume that voters and candidates are embedded on a…
We study the cost sharing problem for cooperative games in situations where the cost function $C$ is not available via oracle queries, but must instead be derived from data, represented as tuples $(S, C(S))$, for different subsets $S$ of…
Shapley value is originally a concept in econometrics to fairly distribute both gains and costs to players in a coalition game. In the recent decades, its application has been extended to other areas such as marketing, engineering and…
There has been much recent work on multiwinner voting systems. However, sometimes a committee is highly structured, and if we want to vote for such a committee, our voting method should be more structured as well. We consider committees…
The computation of a solution concept of a cooperative game usually employs values of all coalitions. However, in some applications, the values of some of the coalitions might be unknown due to high costs associated with their determination…
Big Boss Games represent a specific class of cooperative games where a single veto player, known as the Big Boss, plays a central role in determining resource allocation and maintaining coalition stability. In this paper, we introduce a…
Research in cooperative games often assumes that agents know the coalitional values with certainty, and that they can belong to one coalition only. By contrast, this work assumes that the value of a coalition is based on an underlying…