Related papers: How to choose a Compatible Committee?
The Shapley value, originating from cooperative game theory, has been employed to define responsibility measures that quantify the contributions of database facts to obtaining a given query answer. For non-numeric queries, this is done by…
Following the work of Lloyd Shapley on the Shapley value, and tangentially the work of Guillermo Owen, we offer an alternative non-probabilistic formulation of part of the work of Robert J. Weber in his 1978 paper "Probabilistic values for…
Multiwinner voting rules are used to select a small representative subset of candidates or items from a larger set given the preferences of voters. However, if candidates have sensitive attributes such as gender or ethnicity (when selecting…
We provide a formal definition of blameworthiness in settings where multiple agents can collaborate to avoid a negative outcome. We first provide a method for ascribing blameworthiness to groups relative to an epistemic state (a…
Two straightforward methods to extend an assessment of individual elements to groups are to sum individual assessments or to treat the group as a single merged element and assess it accordingly. In this work, we analyze another natural…
We investigate the distribution of the well-studied Shapley--Shubik values in weighted voting games where the agents are stochastically determined. The Shapley--Shubik value measures the voting power of an agent, in typical collective…
Multi-winner voting is the process of selecting a fixed-size set of representative candidates based on voters' preferences. It occurs in applications ranging from politics (parliamentary elections) to the design of modern computer…
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of…
Blame attribution is one of the key aspects of accountable decision making, as it provides means to quantify the responsibility of an agent for a decision making outcome. In this paper, we study blame attribution in the context of…
We consider a voting model, where a number of candidates need to be selected subject to certain feasibility constraints. The model generalises committee elections (where there is a single constraint on the number of candidates that need to…
Measuring contributions is a classical problem in cooperative game theory where the Shapley value is the most well-known solution concept. In this paper, we establish the convergence property of the Shapley value in parametric Bayesian…
Feature selection is a classical problem in statistics and machine learning, and it continues to remain an extremely challenging problem especially in the context of unknown non-linear relationships with dependent features. On the other…
Collaborative machine learning (ML) is an appealing paradigm to build high-quality ML models by training on the aggregated data from many parties. However, these parties are only willing to share their data when given enough incentives,…
Committee scoring rules form a rich class of aggregators of voters' preferences for the purpose of selecting subsets of objects with desired properties, e.g., a shortlist of candidates for an interview, a representative collective body such…
Not all real-world data are labeled, and when labels are not available, it is often costly to obtain them. Moreover, as many algorithms suffer from the curse of dimensionality, reducing the features in the data to a smaller set is often of…
Measuring individual productivity (or equivalently distributing the overall productivity) in a network structure of workers displaying peer effects has been a subject of ongoing interest in many areas ranging from academia to industry. In…
We design two mechanisms that ensure that the majority preferred option wins in all equilibria. The first one is a simultaneous game where agents choose other agents to cooperate with on top of the vote for an alternative, thus overcoming…
We introduce a natural variant of weighted voting games, which we refer to as k-Prize Weighted Voting Games. Such games consist of n players with weights, and k prizes, of possibly differing values. The players form coalitions, and the i-th…
Originally introduced in cooperative game theory, Shapley values have become a very popular tool to explain machine learning predictions. Based on Shapley's fairness axioms, every input (feature component) gets a credit how it contributes…
We consider a committee voting on whether to adopt a reform under a quota rule, where members differ in how much they value the reform some supporting it, others opposing it. We examine how members can influence each other's votes through…