Related papers: How to choose a Compatible Committee?
This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition…
This paper studies how to attain fairness in communication for omniscience, where a set of users exchange their observations of a discrete multiple random source to attain omniscience---the state that all users recover the entire source.…
For feature selection and related problems, we introduce the notion of classification game, a cooperative game, with features as players and hinge loss based characteristic function and relate a feature's contribution to Shapley value based…
This paper re-examines the Shapley value methods for attribution analysis in the area of online advertising. As a credit allocation solution in cooperative game theory, Shapley value method directly quantifies the contribution of online…
When selecting committees based on preferences of voters, a variety of different criteria can be considered. Two natural objectives are maximizing the utilitarian welfare (the sum of voters' utilities) and coverage (the number of…
User interactions in online recommendation platforms create interdependencies among content creators: feedback on one creator's content influences the system's learning and, in turn, the exposure of other creators' contents. To analyze…
In participatory budgeting we are given a set of projects---each with a cost, an available budget, and a set of voters who in some form express their preferences over the projects. The goal is to select---based on voter preferences---a…
We propose a new model to detect the overlapping communities of a network that is based on cooperative games and mathematical programming. More specifically, communities are defined as stable coalitions of a weighted graph community game…
Additive feature explanations using Shapley values have become popular for providing transparency into the relative importance of each feature to an individual prediction of a machine learning model. While Shapley values provide a unique…
We study the election control problem with multi-votes, where each voter can present a single vote according different views (or layers, we use "layer" to represent "view"). For example, according to the attributes of candidates, such as:…
Cooperative game theory methods, notably Shapley values, have significantly enhanced machine learning (ML) interpretability. However, existing explainable AI (XAI) frameworks mainly attribute average model predictions, overlooking…
"How much is my data worth?" is an increasingly common question posed by organizations and individuals alike. An answer to this question could allow, for instance, fairly distributing profits among multiple data contributors and determining…
The Shapley value is one of the most widely used measures of feature importance partly as it measures a feature's average effect on a model's prediction. We introduce joint Shapley values, which directly extend Shapley's axioms and…
The Shapley value is a common tool in game theory to evaluate the importance of a player in a cooperative setting. In a geometric context, it provides a way to measure the contribution of a geometric object in a set towards some function on…
In this manuscript, we define and study probabilistic values for cooperative games on simplicial complexes. Inspired by the work of Weber "Probabilistic values for games", we establish the new theory step by step, following the classical…
This paper introduces a measure of uncertainty in the determination of the Shapley value, illustrates it with examples, and studies some of its properties. The introduced measure of uncertainty quantifies random variations in a player's…
May's Theorem (1952), a celebrated result in social choice, provides the foundation for majority rule. May's crucial assumption of symmetry, often thought of as a procedural equity requirement, is violated by many choice procedures that…
A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of different options which are the matter of a preferential vote. In contrast to a previous article, here the individual votes are allowed to be incomplete, that is, they…
We study the {PAC} learnability of multiwinner voting, focusing on the class of approval-based committee scoring (ABCS) rules. These are voting rules applied on profiles with approval ballots, where each voter approves some of the…
In many cases the Nash equilibria are not predictive of the experimental players' behaviour. For some games of Game Theory it is proposed here a method to estimate the probabilities with which the different options will be actually chosen…