A continuous rating method for preferential voting. The incomplete case
Abstract
A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of different options which are the matter of a preferential vote. In contrast to a previous article, here the individual votes are allowed to be incomplete, that is, they need not express a comparison between every pair of options. This includes the case where each voter gives an ordered list restricted to a subset of most preferred options. In this connection, the proposed method (except for one of the given variants) carefully distinguishes a lack of information about a given pair of options from a proper tie between them. As in the special case of complete individual votes, the proposed generalization is proved to have certain desirable properties, which include: the continuity of the rates with respect to the data, a decomposition property that characterizes certain situations opposite to a tie, the Condorcet-Smith principle, and clone consistency
Cite
@article{arxiv.0912.2195,
title = {A continuous rating method for preferential voting. The incomplete case},
author = {Rosa Camps and Xavier Mora and Laia Saumell},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:0912.2195},
year = {2012}
}
Comments
Part two of a revised version of arxiv:0810.2263. Version 3 is the result of several minor improvements