Robustness of Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting Rules
Computer Science and Game Theory
2026-01-28 v1
Abstract
We investigate how robust approval-based multiwinner voting rules are to small perturbations in the votes. In particular, we consider the extent to which a committee can change after we add/remove/swap one approval, and we consider the computational complexity of deciding how many such operations are necessary to change the set of winning committees. We also consider the counting variants of our problems, which can be interpreted as computing the probability that the result of an election changes after a given number of random perturbations of the given election.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2601.19706,
title = {Robustness of Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting Rules},
author = {Piotr Faliszewski and Grzegorz Gawron and Bartosz Kusek},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2601.19706},
year = {2026}
}
Comments
arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:2208.00750