Related papers: Non-clairvoyant Scheduling Games
We consider a game-theoretic variant of an interval scheduling problem. Every job is associated with a length, a weight, and a color. Each player controls all the jobs of a specific color, and needs to decide on a processing interval for…
How is efficiency affected when demand excesses over supply are signalled through waiting in queues? We consider a class of congestion games with a nonatomic set of players of a constant mass, based on a formulation of generic linear…
We describe a new coordination mechanism for non-atomic congestion games that leads to a (selfish) social cost which is arbitrarily close to the non-selfish optimal. This mechanism does not incur any additional extra cost, like tolls, which…
We study cost-sharing games in real-time scheduling systems where the activation cost of the server at any given time is a function of its load. We focus on monomial cost functions and consider both the case when the degree is less than one…
We consider energy-efficient scheduling on multiprocessors, where the speed of each processor can be individually scaled, and a processor consumes power $s^{\alpha}$ when running at speed $s$, for $\alpha>1$. A scheduling algorithm needs to…
In this paper, we introduce an improved upper bound for the efficiency of Nash equilibria in utilitarian scheduling games on related machines. The machines have varying speeds and adhere to the Shortest Processing Time (SPT) policy as the…
To keep pace with Moore's law, chip designers have focused on increasing the number of cores per chip rather than single core performance. In turn, modern jobs are often designed to run on any number of cores. However, to effectively…
We study non-atomic congestion games on parallel-link networks with affine cost functions. We investigate the power of machine-learned predictions in the design of coordination mechanisms aimed at minimizing the impact of selfishness. Our…
We study the problem of preemptively scheduling jobs online over time on a single machine to minimize the total flow time. In the traditional clairvoyant scheduling model, the scheduler learns about the processing time of a job at its…
We propose a model of interdependent scheduling games in which each player controls a set of services that they schedule independently. A player is free to schedule his own services at any time; however, each of these services only begins…
Price of anarchy quantifies the degradation of social welfare in games due to the lack of a centralized authority that can enforce the optimal outcome. At its antipodes, mechanism design studies how to ameliorate these effects by…
We consider a strategic game, where players submit jobs to a machine that executes all jobs in a way that minimizes energy while respecting the given deadlines. The energy consumption is then charged to the players in some way. Each player…
We consider a scheduling game on parallel related machines, in which jobs try to minimize their completion time by choosing a machine to be processed on. Each machine uses an individual priority list to decide on the order according to…
This paper investigates the non-clairvoyant parallel machine scheduling problem with prediction, with the objective of minimizing the makespan. Improved lower bounds for the problem and competitive ratios of online algorithms with respect…
In cost sharing games, the existence and efficiency of pure Nash equilibria fundamentally depends on the method that is used to share the resources' costs. We consider a general class of resource allocation problems in which a set of…
We consider job scheduling settings, with multiple machines, where jobs arrive online and choose a machine selfishly so as to minimize their cost. Our objective is the classic makespan minimization objective, which corresponds to the…
We study a pricing game in multi-hop relay networks where nodes price their services and route their traffic selfishly and strategically. In this game, each node (1) announces pricing functions which specify the payments it demands from its…
We study {\em bottleneck congestion games} where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion of any resource. These games directly relate to network routing problems and also job-shop scheduling problems. In typical bottleneck…
We study allocation mechanisms that utilize costly signaling as a screening tool. A social planner aims to maximize social welfare, defined as the weighted sum of agents' utilities, while implementing a specific allocation rule. Within a…
Scheduling is a critical part of practical computer systems, and scheduling has also been extensively studied from a theoretical perspective. Unfortunately, there is a gap between theory and practice, as the optimal scheduling policies…