Optimizing the Social Cost of Congestion Games by Imposing Variable Delays
Computer Science and Game Theory
2014-06-20 v1
Abstract
We describe a new coordination mechanism for non-atomic congestion games that leads to a (selfish) social cost which is arbitrarily close to the non-selfish optimal. This mechanism does not incur any additional extra cost, like tolls, which are usually differentiated from the social cost as expressed in terms of delays only.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1406.5153,
title = {Optimizing the Social Cost of Congestion Games by Imposing Variable Delays},
author = {Josep Díaz and Ioannis Giotis and Lefteris Kirousis and Yiannis Mourtos and Maria J. Serna},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1406.5153},
year = {2014}
}