Related papers: Non-clairvoyant Scheduling Games
Cloud computing is a newly emerging distributed system which is evolved from Grid computing. Task scheduling is the core research of cloud computing which studies how to allocate the tasks among the physical nodes, so that the tasks can get…
We study selfish routing games where users can choose between regular and priority service for each network edge on their chosen path. Priority users pay an additional fee, but in turn they may travel the edge prior to non-priority users,…
We study a single-server scheduling problem for the objective of minimizing the expected cumulative holding cost incurred by jobs, where parameters defining stochastic job holding costs are unknown to the scheduler. We consider a general…
We consider the problem of dynamically scheduling J jobs on N processors for non-preemptive execution where the value of each job (or the reward garnered upon completion) decays over time. All jobs are initially available in a buffer and…
We study policies aiming to minimize the weighted sum of completion times of jobs in the context of coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling problems. Our goal is to design local policies that achieve a good price of anarchy in the…
Consider the problem in which n jobs that are classified into k types are to be scheduled on m identical machines without preemption. A machine requires a proper setup taking s time units before processing jobs of a given type. The…
The efficiency of a game is typically quantified by the price of anarchy (PoA), defined as the worst ratio of the objective function value of an equilibrium --- solution of the game --- and that of an optimal outcome. Given the tremendous…
We study the efficiency of mechanisms for allocating a divisible resource. Given scalar signals submitted by all users, such a mechanism decides the fraction of the resource that each user will receive and a payment that will be collected…
The price of anarchy has become a standard measure of the efficiency of equilibria in games. Most of the literature in this area has focused on establishing worst-case bounds for specific classes of games, such as routing games or more…
Overcoming the impact of selfish behavior of rational players in multiagent systems is a fundamental problem in game theory. Without any intervention from a central agent, strategic users take actions in order to maximize their personal…
In many traditional job scheduling settings, it is assumed that one knows the time it will take for a job to complete service. In such cases, strategies such as shortest job first can be used to improve performance in terms of measures such…
We consider the problem in which n items arrive to a market sequentially over time, where two agents compete to choose the best possible item. When an agent selects an item, he leaves the market and obtains a payoff given by the value of…
We consider non-cooperative unsplittable congestion games where players share resources, and each player's strategy is pure and consists of a subset of the resources on which it applies a fixed weight. Such games represent unsplittable…
This paper studies a dynamic discrete-time queuing model where at every period players get a new job and must send all their jobs to a queue that has a limited capacity. Players have an incentive to send their jobs as late as possible;…
Deep neural networks training jobs and other iterative computations frequently include checkpoints where jobs can be canceled based on the current value of monitored metrics. While most of existing results focus on the performance of all…
This paper studies a nonzero-sum Dynkin game in discrete time under non-exponential discounting. For both players, there are two levels of game-theoretic reasoning intertwined. First, each player looks for an intra-personal equilibrium…
Most practical scheduling applications involve some uncertainty about the arriving times and lengths of the jobs. Stochastic online scheduling is a well-established model capturing this. Here the arrivals occur online, while the processing…
We study an information design problem for a non-atomic service scheduling game. The service starts at a random time and there is a continuum of agent population who have a prior belief about the service start time but do not observe the…
This paper studies queueing problems with an endogenous number of machines with and without an initial queue, the novelty being that coalitions not only choose how to queue, but also on how many machines. For a given problem, agents can…
The price of anarchy, originally introduced to quantify the inefficiency of selfish behavior in routing games, is extended to mean field games. The price of anarchy is defined as the ratio of a worst case social cost computed for a mean…