相关论文: Evolutionary game dynamics in inhomogeneous popula…

The paper presents a model of two-speed evolution in which the payoffs in the population game (or, alternatively, the individual preferences) slowly adjust to changes in the aggregate behavior of the population. The model investigates how,…

The environment has a strong influence on a population's evolutionary dynamics. Driven by both intrinsic and external factors, the environment is subject to continual change in nature. To capture an ever-changing environment, we consider a…

Evolution in finite populations is often modelled using the classical Moran process. Over the last ten years this methodology has been extended to structured populations using evolutionary graph theory. An important question in any such…

We introduce the notion of regularized Bayesian best response (RBBR) learning dynamic in heterogeneous population games. We obtain such a dynamic via perturbation by an arbitrary lower semicontinuous, strongly convex regularizer in Bayesian…

We demonstrate a vast expansion of the theory of evolutionary stability to finite populations with mutation, connecting the theory of the stationary distribution of the Moran process with the Lyapunov theory of evolutionary stability. We…

Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly at random from a set of two…

We consider a model for a population in a heterogeneous environment, with logistic type local population dynamics, under the assumption that individuals can switch between two different nonzero rates of diffusion. Such switching behavior…

In a laboratory experiment, round by round, individual interactions should lead to the social evolutionary rotation in population strategy state space. Successive switching the incentive parameter should lead to successive change of the…

Applying the concepts and formalisms from Evolutionary Game Theory to the data regime, the fundamental paradigms of Evolutionary Data Theory are introduced. Interpreting data in matrix form as evolutionary entities, input data is mapped to…

Human societies around the world interact with each other by developing and maintaining social norms, and it is critically important to understand how such norms emerge and change. In this work, we define an evolutionary game-theoretic…

Most population models assume that individuals within a given population are identical, that is, the fundamental role of variation is ignored. Inhomogeneous models of populations and communities allow for birth and death rates to vary among…

Game dynamics in which three or more strategies are cyclically competitive, as represented by the rock-scissors-paper game, have attracted practical and theoretical interests. In evolutionary dynamics, cyclic competition results in…

When group members claim a portion of limited resources, it is tempting to invest more effort to get a larger share. However, if everyone acts similarly, they all get the same piece they would obtain without extra effort. This is the…

We integrate dual-process theories of human cognition with evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of automatic and controlled decision-making processes. We introduce a model where agents who make decisions using either automatic or…

From a self-centered perspective, it can be assumed that people only hold opinions that can benefit them. If opinions have no intrinsic value, and acquire their value when held by the majority of individuals in a discussion group, then we…

When a prediction algorithm serves a collection of users, disparities in prediction quality are likely to emerge. If users respond to accurate predictions by increasing engagement, inviting friends, or adopting trends, repeated learning…

Evolutionary dynamics can be studied in well-mixed or structured populations. Population structure typically arises from the heterogeneous distribution of individuals in physical space or on social networks. Here we introduce a new type of…

Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is the defining concept of evolutionary game theory. It has a fairly unanimously accepted definition for the case of symmetric games which are played in a homogeneous population where all individuals are…

Emerging applications in engineering such as crowd-sourcing and (mis)information propagation involve a large population of heterogeneous users or agents in a complex network who strategically make dynamic decisions. In this work, we…

We model evolution according to an asymmetric game as occurring in multiple finite populations, one for each role in the game, and study the effect of subjecting individuals to stochastic strategy mutations. We show that, when these…