相关论文: Arrovian juntas
We study the behavior of Range Voting and Normalized Range Voting with respect to electoral control. Electoral control encompasses attempts from an election chair to alter the structure of an election in order to change the outcome. We show…
In this paper, we propose a framework to study a general class of strategic behavior in voting, which we call vote operations. We prove the following theorem: if we fix the number of alternatives, generate $n$ votes i.i.d. according to a…
We present a new model that describes the process of electing a group of representatives (e.g., a parliament) for a group of voters. In this model, called the voting committee model, the elected group of representatives runs a number of…
An important desideratum in approval-based multiwinner voting is proportionality. We study the problem of reconfiguring proportional committees: given two proportional committees, is there a transition path that consists only of…
Perpetual voting was recently introduced as a framework for long-term collective decision making. In this framework, we consider a sequence of subsequent approval-based elections and try to achieve a fair overall outcome. To achieve…
We consider the approval-based model of elections, and undertake a computational study of voting rules which select committees whose size is not predetermined. While voting rules that output committees with a predetermined number of winning…
In this study, we propose a generalization of the classic model of liquid democracy that allows fractional delegation of voting weight, while simultaneously allowing for the existence of equilibrium states. Our approach empowers agents to…
We study the election control problem with multi-votes, where each voter can present a single vote according different views (or layers, we use "layer" to represent "view"). For example, according to the attributes of candidates, such as:…
To aggregate rankings into a social ranking, one can use scoring systems such as Plurality, Veto, and Borda. We distinguish three types of methods: ranking by score, ranking by repeatedly choosing a winner that we delete and rank at the…
We bring forward a logical system of transition algebras that enhances many-sorted first-order logic using features from dynamic logics. The sentences we consider include compositions, unions, and transitive closures of transition…
A new game-theoretic approach for combining multiple classifiers is proposed. A short introduction in Game Theory and coalitions illustrate the way any collective decision scheme can be viewed as a competitive game of coalitions that are…
We study the control complexity of fallback voting. Like manipulation and bribery, electoral control describes ways of changing the outcome of an election; unlike manipulation or bribery attempts, control actions---such as…
Dokow and Holzman determined which predicates over $\{0, 1\}$ satisfy an analog of Arrow's theorem: all unanimous aggregators are dictatorial. Szegedy and Xu, extending earlier work of Dokow and Holzman, extended this to predicates over…
We deal with the monadic (second-order) theory of order. We prove all known results in a unified way, show a general way of reduction, prove more results and show the limitation on extending them. We prove (CH) that the monadic theory of…
We introduce layer systems for proving generalizations of the modularity of confluence for first-order rewrite systems. Layer systems specify how terms can be divided into layers. We establish structural conditions on those systems that…
AI alignment and participatory design motivate a new democratic design problem: how to collectively choose a decision rule to use repeatedly. We study this problem for linear ranking rules, which repeatedly rank items $x_j$ within batches…
We define several different thresholds for election methods by considering different scenarios, corresponding to different proportionality criteria that have been proposed by various authors. In particular, we reformulate the criteria known…
A theorem of alternatives provides a reduction of validity in a substructural logic to validity in its multiplicative fragment. Notable examples include a theorem of Arnon Avron that reduces the validity of a disjunction of multiplicative…
The dynamics of random transitive delegations on a graph are of particular interest when viewed through the lens of an emerging voting paradigm, liquid democracy. This paradigm allows voters to choose between directly voting and…
We consider partially ordered sets of combinatorial structures under consecutive orders, meaning that two structures are related when one embeds in the other such that `consecutive' elements remain consecutive in the image. Given such a…