相关论文: Stable Outcomes For Contract Choice Problems
How do decisions change with the economic environment and with time? This paper studies general nonstationary stopping problems and provides the methodological tools to answer these questions. First, we identify conditions that ensure a…
For a class of quasi-variational inequalities (QVIs) of obstacle-type the stability of its solution set and associated optimal control problems are considered. These optimal control problems are non-standard in the sense that they involve…
In a stable matching problem there are two groups of agents, with agents on one side having their individual preferences for agents on another side as a potential match. It is assumed silently that agents can freely and costlessly ``switch"…
A stable joint plan should guarantee the achievement of a designer's goal in a multi-agent environment, while ensuring that deviations from the prescribed plan would be detected. We present a computational framework where stable joint plans…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley [GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
The many-to-one stable matching problem provides the fundamental abstraction of several real-world matching markets such as school choice and hospital-resident allocation. The agents on both sides are often referred to as residents and…
A commonly used approach to study stability in a complex system is by analyzing the Jacobian matrix at an equilibrium point of a dynamical system. The equilibrium point is stable if all eigenvalues have negative real parts. Here, by…
In this work we present a strategic network formation model predicting the emergence of multigroup structures. Individuals decide to form or remove links based on the benefits and costs those connections carry; we focus on bilateral consent…
We study the formation of stable outcomes via simple dynamics in cardinal hedonic games, where the utilities of agents change over time depending on the history of the coalition formation process. Specifically, we analyze situations where…
A standard type of uncertainty set in robust optimization is budgeted uncertainty, where an interval of possible values for each parameter is given and the total deviation from their lower bounds is bounded. In the two-stage setting,…
We thoroughly study a generalized version of the classic Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems where agents may share partners. We consider two prominent stability concepts: ordinal stability [Aharoni and Fleiner, Journal of…
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of…
Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…
We consider two-sided matching markets, and study the incentives of agents to circumvent a centralized clearing house by signing binding contracts with one another. It is well-known that if the clearing house implements a stable match and…
We study a variant of the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students where ties are allowed in the preference lists of students and lecturers (SPA-ST). We investigate the concept of strong stability in this…
The Stable Marriage Problem, as proposed by Gale and Shapley, considers producing a bipartite matching between two equally sized sets of boys (proposers) and respectively girls (acceptors), each member having a total preference order over…
This paper studies contracting in the presence of externalities with a non-contractible outsider. Multiple equilibria arise from strategic symmetry between the insider agent and the outsider. To address strategic uncertainty, the principal…
Conformal prediction offers a distribution-free framework for constructing prediction sets with coverage guarantees. In practice, multiple valid conformal prediction sets may be available, arising from different models or methodologies.…
We analyse a coalition formation game between strategic service providers of a congestible service. The key novelty of our formulation is that it is a constant sum game, i.e., the total payoff across all service providers (or coalitions of…
In a many-to-one matchingmodel with responsive preferences in which indifferences are allowed, we study three notions of core, three notions of stability, and their relationships. We show that (i) the core contains the stable set, (ii) the…