相关论文: Stable Outcomes For Contract Choice Problems

This paper demonstrates the existence of a finite set of equilibria in the case of the indeterminacy of linear rational expectations models. The number of equilibria corresponds to the number of ways to select n eigenvectors among a larger…

For given non-consistent initial conditions, we study the stability of a class of generalised linear systems of difference equations with constant coefficients and taking into account that the leading coefficient can be a singular matrix.…

Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can do things more…

We consider stability concepts for random matchings where agents have preferences over objects and objects have priorities for the agents. When matchings are deterministic, the standard stability concept also captures the fairness property…

In this paper, we examine \emph{hedonic coalition formation games} in which each player's preferences over partitions of players depend only on the members of his coalition. We present three main results in which restrictions on the…

We consider a single-server cyclic polling system with three queues where the server follows an adaptive rule: if it finds one of queues empty in a given cycle, it decides not to visit that queue in the next cycle. In the case of limited…

We study a two-period moral hazard problem; there are two agents, with action sets that are unknown to the principal. The principal contracts with each agent sequentially, and seeks to maximize the worst-case discounted sum of payoffs,…

We highlight the tension between stability and equality in non transferable utility matching. We consider many to one matchings and refer to the two sides of the market as students and schools. The latter have aligned preferences, which in…

Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm of near-feasibility in capacitated matching settings, where…

We make two contributions to the study of polite combination in satisfiability modulo theories. The first contribution is a separation between politeness and strong politeness, by presenting a polite theory that is not strongly polite. This…

We consider the situation in which an organizer is trying to convene an event, and needs to choose a subset of agents to be invited. Agents have preferences over how many attendees should be at the event and possibly also who the attendees…

This paper addresses the bipartite consensus-control problem in open multi-agent systems containing both cooperative and antagonistic interactions. In these systems, new agents can join and new interactions can be formed over time.…

We provide explicit conditions for uniform stability, global asymptotic stability and uniform exponential stability for dynamic equations with a single delay and a nonnegative coefficient. Some examples on nonstandard time scales are also…

The paper contains a discussion on a number of open problems in queueing theory. Some of them are known for decades, some are more recent. They relate to stability and to rare events. There is an idea to prepare a special issue of QUESTA on…

We survey the problem of deciding the stability or stabilizability of uncertain linear systems whose region of uncertainty is a polytope. This natural setting has applications in many fields of applied science, from Control Theory to…

The classic Stable Roommates problem (which is the non-bipartite generalization of the well-known Stable Marriage problem) asks whether there is a stable matching for a given set of agents, i.e. a partitioning of the agents into disjoint…

This paper studies two-sided many-to-one matching in which firms have complementary preferences. We show that stable matchings exist under a balancedness condition that rules out a specific type of odd-length cycles formed by firms'…

Two-sided matching markets, environments in which two disjoint groups of agents seek to partner with one another, arise in several contexts. In static, centralized markets where agents know their preferences, standard algorithms can yield a…

The stable marriage problem, as addressed by Gale and Shapely [1] consists of providing a bipartite matching between n " boys " and n " girls "-each of whom have a totally ordered preference list over the other set-such that there exists no…

We consider abstract-argumentation-theoretic coalition formability in this work. Taking a model from political alliance among political parties, we will contemplate profitability, and then formability, of a coalition. As is commonly…