相关论文: Budget Optimization in Search-Based Advertising Au…

We study the problem of computing optimal prices for a version of the Product-Mix auction with budget constraints. In contrast to the ``standard'' Product-Mix auction, the objective is to maximize revenue instead of social welfare. We prove…

We establish a general optimization framework for the design of automated bidding agent in dynamic online marketplaces. It optimizes solely for the buyer's interest and is agnostic to the auction mechanism imposed by the seller. As a…

In online display advertising, guaranteed contracts and real-time bidding (RTB) are two major ways to sell impressions for a publisher. For large publishers, simultaneously selling impressions through both guaranteed contracts and in-house…

Algorithms increasingly automate bidding in online auctions, raising concerns about tacit bid suppression and revenue shortfalls. Prior work identifies individual mechanisms behind algorithmic bid suppression, but it remains unclear which…

We study how a budget-constrained bidder should learn to adaptively bid in repeated first-price auctions to maximize her cumulative payoff. This problem arose due to an industry-wide shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions…

After experimentation with other designs, the major search engines converged on the weighted, generalized second-price auction (wGSP) for selling keyword advertisements. Notably, this convergence occurred before position auctions were well…

Online bidding serves as a fundamental information system in mobile ecosystems, facilitating real-time ad allocation across billions of devices while optimizing both platform performance and user experience through data-driven decision…

In online advertising, advertisers commonly utilize auto-bidding services to bid for impression opportunities. A typical objective of the auto-bidder is to optimize the advertiser's cumulative value of winning impressions within specified…

Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, and also a number of killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from how governments sell wireless spectrum licenses to how the major…

We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…

This paper describes an engine to optimize web publisher revenues from second-price auctions. These auctions are widely used to sell online ad spaces in a mechanism called real-time bidding (RTB). Optimization within these auctions is…

We derive optimal strategies for a bidding agent that participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We prove that, if everyone else bids locally in a single auction, the global bidder should always…

We present a model of digital advertising with three key features: (i) advertisers can reach consumers on and off a platform, (ii) additional data enhances the value of advertiser-consumer matches, and (iii) bidding follows auction-like…

We analyze the optimal information design in a click-through auction with fixed valuations per click, but stochastic click-through rates. While the auctioneer takes as given the auction rule of the click-through auction, namely the…

The all-pay auction, a classic competitive model, is widely applied in scenarios such as political elections, sports competitions, and research and development, where all participants pay their bids regardless of winning or losing. However,…

We design fair sponsored search auctions that achieve a near-optimal tradeoff between fairness and quality. Our work builds upon the model and auction design of Chawla and Jagadeesan \cite{CJ22}, who considered the special case of a single…

In this paper, we propose a bid optimizer for sponsored keyword search auctions which leads to better retention of advertisers by yielding attractive utilities to the advertisers without decreasing the revenue to the search engine. The bid…

The current art in optimal combinatorial auctions is limited to handling the case of single units of multiple items, with each bidder bidding on exactly one bundle (single minded bidders). This paper extends the current art by proposing an…

We consider the optimal pricing problem for a model of the rich media advertisement market, as well as other related applications. In this market, there are multiple buyers (advertisers), and items (slots) that are arranged in a line such…

Online Resource Allocation addresses the problem of efficiently allocating limited resources to buyers with incomplete knowledge of future requests. In our setting, buyers arrive sequentially requesting a set of items, each with a value…