相关论文: Stable partitions in coalitional games

We analyze a cooperative game, where the cooperative act is not based on the previous behaviour of the co-player, but on the similarity between the players. This system has been studied in a mean-field description recently [A. Traulsen and…

The stable cooperation ratio of spatial evolutionary games has been widely studied using simulations or approximate analysis methods. However, sometimes such ``stable'' cooperation ratios obtained via approximate methods might not be…

We consider the problem of payoff division in indivisible coalitional games, where the value of the grand coalition is a natural number. This number represents a certain quantity of indivisible objects, such as parliamentary seats, kidney…

Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the…

Cooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat defectors, because…

We conduct a computational analysis of fair and optimal partitions in additively separable hedonic games. We show that, for strict preferences, a Pareto optimal partition can be found in polynomial time while verifying whether a given…

In this paper, we introduce the third party to achieve the Stackelberg equilibrium with the time inconsistency in three different Stackelberg games, which are the discrete-time games, the dynamic games, and the mean field games. Here all…

Leaving the joint enterprise when defection is unveiled is always a viable option to avoid being exploited. Although loner strategy helps the population not to be trapped into the tragedy of the commons state, it could offer only a modest…

An independent set game is a cooperative game defined on graphs and dealing with profit-sharing in maximum independent set problems. A population monotonic allocation scheme is a rule specifying how to share the profit of each coalition…

We explore partitions that lie in the intersection of several sets of classical interest: partitions with parts indivisible by $m$, appearing fewer than $m$ times, or differing by less than $m$. We find results on their behavior and…

The matching game is a cooperative game where the value of every coalition is the maximum revenue of players in the coalition can make by forming pairwise disjoint partners. The multiple partners matching game generalizes the matching game…

Partition functions for non-interacting particles are known to be symmetric functions. It is shown that powerful group-theoretical techniques can be used not only to derive these relationships, but also to significantly simplify calculation…

Stability of evolutionary dynamics of non-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with non-uniform interaction rates [1], via benefit and cost dilemma is studied . Moreover, the stability condition (b+c/b-c)2 < r1r3 is derived in case of…

We thoroughly study a generalized version of the classic Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems where agents may share partners. We consider two prominent stability concepts: ordinal stability [Aharoni and Fleiner, Journal of…

Whether or not cooperation is favored in evolutionary games on graphs depends on the population structure and spatial properties of the interaction network. Population structures can be expressed as configurations. Such configurations…

We study a recently introduced class of strategic games that is motivated by and generalizes Schelling's well-known residential segregation model. These games are played on undirected graphs, with the set of agents partitioned into multiple…

Ranking individuals based on their performance in different coalitions is a problem emerging in various domains (teams sports, scientific evaluation, argumentation, etc.). Often, for practical reasons, the number of comparable coalitions is…

We model a dynamic public good contribution game, where players are (naturally) formed into groups. The groups are exogenously placed in a sequence, with limited information available to players about their groups' position in the sequence.…

This paper considers a dynamic game with transferable utilities (TU), where the characteristic function is a continuous-time bounded mean ergodic process. A central planner interacts continuously over time with the players by choosing the…

We consider the problem of collaborative inference in a sensor network with heterogeneous and statistically dependent sensor observations. Each sensor aims to maximize its inference performance by forming a coalition with other sensors and…