相关论文: Selfish vs. Unselfish Optimization of Network Crea…

What networks can form and persist when agents are self-interested? Can such networks be efficient? A substantial theoretical literature predicts that the only networks that can form and persist must have very special shapes and that such…

The Internet is a loose amalgamation of independent service providers acting in their own self-interest. We examine the implications of this economic reality on peering relationships. Specifically, we consider how the incentives of the…

How do rational agents self-organize when trying to connect to a common target? We study this question with a simple tree formation game which is related to the well-known fair single-source connection game by Anshelevich et al. (FOCS'04)…

Understanding the structure and formation of networks is a central topic in complexity science. Economic networks are formed by decisions of individual agents and thus not properly described by established random graph models. In this…

Dynamic networks are graphs in which edges are available only at specific time instants, modeling connections that change over time. The dynamic network creation game studies this setting as a strategic interaction where each vertex…

We live in a world full of networks where our economy, our communication, and even our social life crucially depends on them. These networks typically emerge from the interaction of many entities, which is why researchers study agent-based…

Organizations consist of individuals connected by their responsibilities, incentives, and reporting structure. These connections are aptly represented by a network, hierarchical or other, which is often used to divide tasks. A primary goal…

Human behavioural patterns exhibit selfish or competitive, as well as selfless or altruistic tendencies, both of which have demonstrable effects on human social and economic activity. In behavioural economics, such effects have…

This technical note presents a leader-follower scheme for network aggregative games. The followers and leader are selfish cost minimizing agents. The cost function of each follower is affected by strategy of leader and aggregated strategies…

Strategic network formation arises where agents receive benefit from connections to other agents, but also incur costs for forming links. We consider a new network formation game that incorporates an adversarial attack, as well as…

We study strategic network formation games in which agents attempt to form (costly) links in order to maximize their network centrality. Our model derives from Jackson and Wolinsky's symmetric connection model, but allows for heterogeneity…

In a social group its members are caled here agents. Any two agents from the group may interact. The interaction consists of the exchange of information and it costs some energy. There exist subgroups of interacting agents which are…

We consider a dynamic social network model in which agents play repeated games in pairings determined by a stochastically evolving social network. Individual agents begin to interact at random, with the interactions modeled as games. The…

Network creation games model the creation and usage costs of networks formed by a set of selfish peers. Each peer has the ability to change the network in a limited way, e.g., by creating or deleting incident links. In doing so, a peer can…

We analyze an agent-based model to estimate how the costs and benefits of users in an online social network (OSN) impact the robustness of the OSN. Benefits are measured in terms of relative reputation that users receives from their…

We study a pricing game in multi-hop relay networks where nodes price their services and route their traffic selfishly and strategically. In this game, each node (1) announces pricing functions which specify the payments it demands from its…

An epidemic spreading in a network calls for a decision on the part of the network members: They should decide whether to protect themselves or not. Their decision depends on the trade-off between their perceived risk of being infected and…

We model the formation of networks as a game where players aspire to maximize their own centrality by increasing the number of other players to which they are path-wise connected, while simultaneously incurring a cost for each added…

We establish a network formation game for the Internet's Autonomous System (AS) interconnection topology. The game includes different types of players, accounting for the heterogeneity of ASs in the Internet. In this network formation game,…

In this paper, I characterize the network formation process as a static game of incomplete information, where the latent payoff of forming a link between two individuals depends on the structure of the network, as well as private…