相关论文: Dichotomy for Voting Systems

We study the problem of designing voting rules that take as input the ordinal preferences of $n$ agents over a set of $m$ alternatives and output a single alternative, aiming to optimize the overall happiness of the agents. The input to the…

We characterize the class of committee scoring rules that satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. In some sense, the committee scoring rules in this class are multiwinner analogues of the single-winner Plurality rule, which is uniquely…

The framework of algorithmic knowledge assumes that agents use algorithms to compute the facts they explicitly know. In many cases of interest, a deductive system, rather than a particular algorithm, captures the formal reasoning used by…

Describing systems in terms of choices and their resulting costs and rewards offers the promise of freeing algorithm designers and programmers from specifying how those choices should be made; in implementations, the choices can be realized…

The traditional axiomatic approach to voting is motivated by the problem of reconciling differences in subjective preferences. In contrast, a dominant line of work in the theory of voting over the past 15 years has considered a different…

Successive elimination of candidates is often a route to making manipulation intractable to compute. We prove that eliminating candidates does not necessarily increase the computational complexity of manipulation. However, for many voting…

Electing a single committee of a small size is a classical and well-understood voting situation. Being interested in a sequence of committees, we introduce and study two time-dependent multistage models based on simple Plurality voting.…

The paper surveys more than forty characterizations of scoring methods for preference aggregation and contains one new result. A general scoring operator is {\it self-consistent} if alternative $i$ is assigned a greater score than $j$…

We study the voting problem with two alternatives where voters' preferences depend on a not-directly-observable state variable. While equilibria in the one-round voting mechanisms lead to a good decision, they are usually hard to compute…

The development of state-of-the-art systems in different applied areas of machine learning (ML) is driven by benchmarks, which have shaped the paradigm of evaluating generalisation capabilities from multiple perspectives. Although the…

Population protocols are a distributed computation model in which a collection of anonymous, finite-state agents interact in randomly chosen pairs and update their states according to a fixed transition function. The computation is defined…

Elections seem simple---aren't they just counting? But they have a unique, challenging combination of security and privacy requirements. The stakes are high; the context is adversarial; the electorate needs to be convinced that the results…

We consider the problem of aggregation of incomplete preferences represented by arbitrary binary relations or incomplete paired comparison matrices. For a number of indirect scoring procedures we examine whether or not they satisfy the…

Sorting is one of the most used and well investigated algorithmic problem [1]. Traditional postulation supposes the sorting data archived, and the elementary operation as comparisons of two numbers. In a view of appearance of new processors…

Committee scoring rules form a rich class of aggregators of voters' preferences for the purpose of selecting subsets of objects with desired properties, e.g., a shortlist of candidates for an interview, a representative collective body such…

One of the traditional mechanisms used in distributed systems for maintaining the consistency of replicated data is voting. A problem involved in voting mechanisms is the size of the Quorums needed on each access to the data. In this paper,…

An electoral spoiler is usually defined as a losing candidate whose removal would affect the outcome by changing the winner. So far, spoiler effects have been analyzed primarily for single-winner electoral systems. We consider this subject…

When each voter rates or ranks several candidates for a single office, a strong Condorcet winner (SCW) is one who beats all others in two-way races. Among 21 electoral systems examined, 18 will sometimes make candidate X the winner even if…

An algorithm for number-partitioning is called value-monotone if whenever one of the input numbers increases, the objective function (the largest sum or the smallest sum of a subset in the output) weakly increases. This note proves that the…

Committee-selection problems arise in many contexts and applications, and there has been increasing interest within the social choice research community on identifying which properties are satisfied by different multi-winner voting rules.…