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Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) represents billions of dollars in extracted value that fundamentally shapes blockchain network dynamics and participant incentives. While research has focused on MEV extraction and mitigation, we lack…

分布式、并行与集群计算 · 计算机科学 2026-05-01 Andrei Seoev , Dmitry Belousov , Anastasiia Smirnova , Ksenia Kurinova , Aleksei Smirnov , Denis Fedyanin , Yury Yanovich

Ethereum has emerged as a leading platform for decentralized applications (dApps) due to its robust smart contract capabilities. One of the critical issues in the Ethereum ecosystem is Maximal Extractable Value (MEV), a concept that has…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2023-12-21 Dipankar Sarkar

This study analyzes proposer-builder data and MEV-Boost payment data following the Ethereum merge in September 2022 to identify patterns of multi-block MEV. Our findings reveal fewer multi-slot sequences of builders than predicted by a…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2025-01-23 Pascal Stichler

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) refers to a wide class of economic attacks to public blockchains, where adversaries with the power to reorder, drop or insert transactions in a block can "extract" value from smart contracts. Empirical…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2026-02-04 Massimo Bartoletti , Roberto Zunino

We consider the sale of a single item to multiple buyers by a revenue-maximizing seller. Recent work of Akbarpour and Li formalizes \emph{credibility} as an auction desideratum, and prove that the only optimal, credible, strategyproof…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2023-10-31 Matheus V. X. Ferreira , S. Matthew Weinberg

We propose a new, more potent attack on decentralized exchanges. This attack leverages absolute commitments, which are commitments that can condition on the strategies made by other agents. This attack allows an adversary to charge monopoly…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-10-18 Daji Landis , Nikolaj I. Schwartzbach

A central question of the Ethereum ecosystem is where Maximal Extractable Value (MEV)revenue originates and to what extent it stems from harming unsuspecting users. It is acceptable if MEV arises from arbitrages between centralised and…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2026-04-20 Bence Ladóczk , Miklós Rásonyi , János Tapolcai

Maximal (also miner) extractable value, or MEV, usually refers to the value that privileged players can extract by strategically ordering, censoring, and placing transactions in a blockchain. Each blockchain network, which we refer to as a…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2022-08-30 Bruno Mazorra , Michael Reynolds , Vanesa Daza

The standard framework of online bidding algorithm design assumes that the seller commits himself to faithfully implementing the rules of the adopted auction. However, the seller may attempt to cheat in execution to increase his revenue if…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2023-11-28 Qian Wang , Xuanzhi Xia , Zongjun Yang , Xiaotie Deng , Yuqing Kong , Zhilin Zhang , Liang Wang , Chuan Yu , Jian Xu , Bo Zheng

Smart contracts led to the emergence of the decentralized finance (DeFi) marketplace within blockchain ecosystems, where diverse participants engage in financial activities. In traditional finance, there are possibilities to create values,…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2024-06-21 Rasheed , Yash Chaurasia , Parth Desai , Sujit Gujar

In proof-of-work based blockchains such as Ethereum, verification of blocks is an integral part of establishing consensus across nodes. However, in Ethereum, miners do not receive a reward for verifying. This implies that miners face the…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2020-04-28 Maher Alharby , Roben Castagna Lunardi , Amjad Aldweesh , Aad van Moorsel

In an open-bid auction, a bidder can know the budgets of other bidders. Thus, a sealed-bid auction that hides bidding prices is desirable. However, in previous sealed-bid auction protocols, it has been difficult to provide a ``fund…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2023-12-14 Kota Chin , Keita Emura , Kazumasa Omote , Shingo Sato

We use historical data to estimate the potential benefit of speculative techniques for executing Ethereum smart contracts in parallel. We replay transaction traces of sampled blocks from the Ethereum blockchain over time, using a simple…

分布式、并行与集群计算 · 计算机科学 2019-01-23 Vikram Saraph , Maurice Herlihy

We study the feasibility, profitability, and prevalence of sandwich attacks on Ethereum rollups with private mempools. First, we extend a formal model of optimal front- and back-run sizing, relating attack profitability to victim trade…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2026-01-28 Krzysztof Gogol , Manvir Schneider , Jan Gorzny , Claudio Tessone

The evolution of blockchain technology, from its origins as a decentralized ledger for cryptocurrencies to its broader applications in areas like decentralized finance (DeFi), has significantly transformed financial ecosystems while…

分布式、并行与集群计算 · 计算机科学 2026-03-04 Daniil Vostrikov , Yash Madhwal , Andrey Seoev , Anastasiia Smirnova , Yury Yanovich , Alexey Smirnov , Vladimir Gorgadze

Transaction fees represent a major incentive in many blockchain systems as a way to incentivize processing transactions. Unfortunately, they also introduce an enormous amount of incentive asymmetry compared to alternatives like fixed block…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2023-02-15 Michael Tang , Alex Zhang

Demand for blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum is far larger than supply, necessitating a mechanism that selects a subset of transactions to include "on-chain" from the pool of all pending transactions. This paper investigates the…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2023-12-27 Tim Roughgarden

Maximum extractable value (MEV) has been extensively studied. In most papers, the researchers have worked with the Ethereum blockchain almost exclusively. Even though, Ethereum and other blockchains have dynamic gas prices this is not the…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2023-03-09 Facundo Carrillo , Elaine Hu

Blockchains have popularized the Automated Market Makers (AMMs), where users trade crypto-assets directly with a smart contract, governed by a pricing function embedded in the contract's code. Today, users of AMMs are often forced to accept…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2026-05-28 Yuhao Li , Elaine Shi , Mengqian Zhang

Classical optimal auction theory assumes that bids reach the seller directly. We study how this picture changes when a revenue-maximizing intermediary controls access to the seller's auction. Motivated by blockchain auctions, online…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2026-05-22 Jingyi Liu , Aviad Rubinstein , Ertem Nusret Tas , S. Matthew Weinberg , Qianfan Zhang