中文
相关论文

相关论文: Imperfect Commitment in Maximal Extractable Value …

200 篇论文

We study optimal auction design for Maximum Extractable Value (MEV) auction markets on Ethereum. Using a dataset of 2.2 million transactions across three major orderflow providers, we establish three empirical regularities: extracted values…

交易与市场微观结构 · 定量金融 2026-03-18 Aleksei Adadurov , Sergey Barseghyan , Anton Chtepine , Antero Eloranta , Andrei Sebyakin , Arsenii Valitov

The Ethereum block-building process has changed significantly since the emergence of Proposer-Builder Separation. Validators access blocks through a marketplace, where block builders bid for the right to construct the block and earn MEV…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-03-19 Fei Wu , Thomas Thiery , Stefanos Leonardos , Carmine Ventre

Maximal extractable value (MEV) in which block proposers unethically gain profits by manipulating the order in which transactions are included within a block, is a key challenge facing blockchains such as Ethereum today. Left unchecked, MEV…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2024-05-16 Yifan Mao , Mengya Zhang , Shaileshh Bojja Venkatakrishnan , Zhiqiang Lin

We analyze maximal extractable value in multiple concurrent proposer blockchains, where multiple blocks become data available before their final execution order is determined. This concurrency breaks the single builder assumption of…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2025-11-18 Steven Landers , Benjamin Marsh

Currently, over 90% of Ethereum blocks are built using MEV-Boost, an auction that allows validators to sell their block-building power to builders who compete in an open English auction in each slot. Shortly after the merge, when MEV-Boost…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2023-11-16 Mallesh Pai , Max Resnick

In this paper, we take a close look at a problem labeled maximal extractable value (MEV), which arises in a blockchain due to the ability of a block producer to manipulate the order of transactions within a block. Indeed, blockchains such…

综合经济学 · 经济学 2024-03-29 Vijay Mohan , Peyman Khezr

Block production on the Ethereum blockchain has adopted an auction-based mechanism known as Proposer--Builder Separation (PBS), where validators outsource block creation to builders competing in MEV--Boost auctions for Maximal Extractable…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2025-10-01 Fei Wu , Thomas Thiery , Stefanos Leonardos , Carmine Ventre

The MEV-Boost block auction contributes approximately 90% of all Ethereum blocks. Between October 2023 and March 2024, only three builders produced 80% of them, highlighting the concentration of power within the block builder market. To…

计算工程、金融与科学 · 计算机科学 2024-07-22 Burak Öz , Danning Sui , Thomas Thiery , Florian Matthes

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has become a critical issue for blockchain ecosystems, as it enables validators or block proposers to extract value by ordering, including or censoring users' transactions. This paper aims to present a formal…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2023-06-30 Bruno Mazorra , Nicolás Della Penna

Validators in permissionless, large-scale blockchains, such as Ethereum, are typically payoff-maximizing, rational actors. Ethereum relies on in-protocol incentives, like rewards for correct and timely votes, to induce honest behavior and…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2025-05-06 Roozbeh Sarenche , Ertem Nusret Tas , Barnabe Monnot , Caspar Schwarz-Schilling , Bart Preneel

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) drives the prosperity of the blockchain ecosystem. By strategically including, excluding, or reordering transactions within blocks, block producers can extract additional value, which in turn incentivizes…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2024-10-11 Tianyang Chi , Ningyu He , Xiaohui Hu , Haoyu Wang

Blockchains protect an ecosystem worth more than $500bn with strong security properties derived from the principle of decentralization. Is today's blockchain decentralized? In this paper, we empirically studied one of the least…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2025-05-01 Sen Yang , Kartik Nayak , Fan Zhang

We study the amount of maximal extractable value (MEV) captured by validators, as a function of searcher competition, in blockchains with competitive block building markets such as Ethereum. We argue that the core is a suitable solution…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2025-10-01 Akaki Mamageishvili , Christoph Schlegel , Benny Sudakov , Danning Sui

Multi-block MEV (MMEV) denotes the practice of securing k-consecutive blocks in an attempt at extracting surplus value by manipulating transaction ordering. Following the implementation of pro-poser/builder separation (PBS) on Ethereum,…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2023-06-13 Johannes Rude Jensen , Victor von Wachter , Omri Ross

We study the economics of transaction reverts on Ethereum rollups and show that they are not accidental failures but equilibrium outcomes of MEV strategies. Using execution traces from major L2s, we find that over 80% of reverted…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2025-09-23 Krzysztof Gogol , Manvir Schneider , Claudio Tessone

The long-term success of cryptocurrencies largely depends on the incentive compatibility provided to the validators. Bribery attacks, facilitated trustlessly via smart contracts, threaten this foundation. This work introduces, implements,…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2026-01-14 Bence Soóki-Tóth , István András Seres , Kamilla Kara , Ábel Nagy , Balázs Pejó , Gergely Biczók

We provide an economic model of Execution Tickets and use it to study the ability of the Ethereum protocol to capture MEV from block construction. We demonstrate that Execution Tickets extract all MEV when all buyers are homogeneous, risk…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-08-22 Jonah Burian , Davide Crapis , Fahad Saleh

With the emergence of Miner Extractable Value (MEV), block construction markets on blockchains have evolved into a competitive arena. Following Ethereum's transition from Proof of Work (PoW) to Proof of Stake (PoS), the Proposer Builder…

网络与互联网体系结构 · 计算机科学 2023-06-06 Anton Wahrstätter , Liyi Zhou , Kaihua Qin , Davor Svetinovic , Arthur Gervais

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) represents a pivotal challenge within the Ethereum ecosystem; it impacts the fairness, security, and efficiency of both Layer 1 (L1) and Layer 2 (L2) networks. MEV arises when miners or validators manipulate…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2025-01-28 Zeinab Alipanahloo , Abdelhakim Senhaji Hafid , Kaiwen Zhang

Cryptocurrency miners have great latitude in deciding which transactions they accept, including their own, and the order in which they accept them. Ethereum miners in particular use this flexibility to collect MEV-Miner Extractable Value-by…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2022-03-31 Julien Piet , Jaiden Fairoze , Nicholas Weaver
‹ 上一页 1 2 3 10 下一页 ›