相关论文: Deception Equilibrium Analysis for Three-Party Sta…

In this paper, we consider a privacy signaling game problem for binary alphabets and single-bit transmission where a transmitter has a pair of messages, one of which is a casual message that needs to be conveyed, whereas the other message…

Similar to a strategic interaction between rational and intelligent agents, cryptography problems can be examined through the prism of game theory. In this setting, the agent aiming to protect a message is called the defender, while the one…

There has been significant recent interest in game-theoretic approaches to security, with much of the recent research focused on utilizing the leader-follower Stackelberg game model. Among the major applications are the ARMOR program…

Existing methods for learning Stackelberg equilibria typically assume that the followers' (variational, generalized) Nash equilibrium is unique. However, in the presence of multiple equilibria, without a selection convention, the problem…

We study multi-player general-sum Markov games with one of the players designated as the leader and the other players regarded as followers. In particular, we focus on the class of games where the followers are myopic, i.e., they aim to…

Identifying the actual adversarial threat against a system vulnerability has been a long-standing challenge for cybersecurity research. To determine an optimal strategy for the defender, game-theoretic based decision models have been widely…

Deception is a crucial tool in the cyberdefence repertoire, enabling defenders to leverage their informational advantage to reduce the likelihood of successful attacks. One way deception can be employed is through obscuring, or masking,…

In this paper, we propose a game-theoretical framework to investigate advanced persistent threat problems with two types of insider threats: malicious and inadvertent. Within this framework, a unified three-player game is established and…

The Stackelberg security game is played between a defender and an attacker, where the defender needs to allocate a limited amount of resources to multiple targets in order to minimize the loss due to adversarial attack by the attacker.…

Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader's…

Distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for multi-coalition games has attracted increasing attention in recent years, but the research mainly focuses on the case without agreement demand within coalitions. This paper considers a…

In this paper, we present an efficient algorithm to solve online Stackelberg games, featuring multiple followers, in a follower-agnostic manner. Unlike previous works, our approach works even when leader has no knowledge about the…

Defensive deception is a promising approach for cyber defense. Via defensive deception, the defender can anticipate attacker actions; it can mislead or lure attacker, or hide real resources. Although defensive deception is increasingly…

We consider multiple access games in which primary users are interested in maximizing their confidential data rate at the minimum possible transmission power and secondary users employ eavesdropping as a leverage to maximize their data rate…

We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…

Progressively intricate cyber infiltration mechanisms have made conventional means of defense, such as firewalls and malware detectors, incompetent. These sophisticated infiltration mechanisms can study the defender's behavior, identify…

Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept in two-player games where the leader has commitment rights over the follower. In recent years, it has become a cornerstone of many security applications, including airport patrolling and…

In this work, we provide a structural characterization of the possible Nash equilibria in the well-studied class of security games with additive utility. Our analysis yields a classification of possible equilibria into seven types and we…

This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the leaders…

We study a two-player dynamic Stackelberg game where the follower's intention is unknown to the leader. Classical formulations of the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) assume that the follower's best response (BR) function is known to the…