相关论文: A Polynomial-Time Axiomatic Alternative to SHAP fo…

Cooperative game theory has become a cornerstone of post-hoc interpretability in machine learning, largely through the use of Shapley values. Yet, despite their widespread adoption, Shapley-based methods often rest on axiomatic…

Numerous works propose post-hoc, model-agnostic explanations for learning to rank, focusing on ordering entities by their relevance to a query through feature attribution methods. However, these attributions often weakly correlate or…

Shapley values have emerged as a central game-theoretic tool in explainable AI (XAI). However, computing Shapley values exactly requires $2^d$ game evaluations for a model with $d$ features. Lundberg and Lee's KernelSHAP algorithm has…

Shapley value-based methods have become foundational in explainable artificial intelligence (XAI), offering theoretically grounded feature attributions through cooperative game theory. However, in practice, particularly in vision tasks, the…

The Shapley value has become popular in the Explainable AI (XAI) literature, thanks, to a large extent, to a solid theoretical foundation, including four "favourable and fair" axioms for attribution in transferable utility games. The…

As Text-to-Image (T2I) diffusion models are increasingly used in real-world creative workflows, a principled framework for valuing contributors who provide a collection of data is essential for fair compensation and sustainable data…

Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) has received widespread interest in recent years, and two of the most popular types of explanations are feature attributions, and counterfactual explanations. These classes of approaches have been…

Cooperative game theory methods, notably Shapley values, have significantly enhanced machine learning (ML) interpretability. However, existing explainable AI (XAI) frameworks mainly attribute average model predictions, overlooking…

Feature selection is a classical problem in statistics and machine learning, and it continues to remain an extremely challenging problem especially in the context of unknown non-linear relationships with dependent features. On the other…

Text-based games are a popular testbed for language-based reinforcement learning (RL). In previous work, deep Q-learning is commonly used as the learning agent. Q-learning algorithms are challenging to apply to complex real-world domains…

We study efficient, linear, and symmetric (ELS) values, a central family of allocation rules for cooperative games with transferable-utility (TU-games) that includes the Shapley value, the CIS value, and the ENSC value. We first show that…

We introduce and study the axiom of null player neutrality in the context of cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games). This axiom weakens the classical coalitional strategic equivalence: rather than requiring that augmenting a…

Following the work of Lloyd Shapley on the Shapley value, and tangentially the work of Guillermo Owen, we offer an alternative non-probabilistic formulation of part of the work of Robert J. Weber in his 1978 paper "Probabilistic values for…

This study introduces the \emph{edge-based Shapley value}, a novel allocation rule within cooperative game theory, specifically tailored for networked systems, where value is generated through interactions represented by edges. Traditional…

We introduce a new class of totally balanced cooperative TU games, namely p -additive games. It is inspired by the class of inventory games that arises from inventory situations with temporary discounts (Toledo, 2002) and contains the class…

The Shapley value is the prevalent solution for fair division problems in which a payout is to be divided among multiple agents. By adopting a game-theoretic view, the idea of fair division and the Shapley value can also be used in machine…

The Shapley value, which is arguably the most popular approach for assigning a meaningful contribution value to players in a cooperative game, has recently been used intensively in explainable artificial intelligence. Its meaningfulness is…

Some well-known solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), such as the Banzhaf value, the Myerson value, and the Aumann-Dreze value, fail to satisfy efficiency. Despite their desirable normative properties, this…

Feature attribution methods have become essential for explaining machine learning models. Many popular approaches, such as SHAP and Banzhaf values, are grounded in power indices from cooperative game theory, which measure the contribution…

In cooperative games with transferable utilities, the Shapley value is an extreme case of marginalism while the Equal Division rule is an extreme case of egalitarianism. The Shapley value does not assign anything to the non-productive…