相关论文: Multi-Head Attention Is a Multi-Player Game

We consider model-based multi-agent reinforcement learning, where the environment transition model is unknown and can only be learned via expensive interactions with the environment. We propose H-MARL (Hallucinated Multi-Agent Reinforcement…

Self-play methods have demonstrated remarkable success in enhancing model capabilities across various domains. In the context of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), self-play not only boosts Large Language Model (LLM)…

Coordination is one of the essential problems in multi-agent systems. Typically multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) methods treat agents equally and the goal is to solve the Markov game to an arbitrary Nash equilibrium (NE) when…

We present a novel algorithm for game-theoretic trajectory planning, tailored for settings in which agents can only observe one another in specific regions of the state space. Such problems arise naturally in the context of multi-robot…

The generation of factually incorrect objects, commonly known as object hallucination, remains a persistent challenge in Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs). Current approaches to address this issue - ranging from expensive data-driven…

Large language models (LLMs) often generate plausible yet incorrect answers, posing risks in safety-critical settings such as medicine. Human evaluation is expensive, and LLM-as-judge approaches risk introducing hidden errors. Recent…

The overall aim of our research is to develop techniques to reason about the equilibrium properties of multi-agent systems. We model multi-agent systems as concurrent games, in which each player is a process that is assumed to act…

We develop a macro-model of information retrieval process using Game Theory as a mathematical theory of conflicts. We represent the participants of the Information Retrieval process as a game of two abstract players. The first player is the…

The effect of population heterogeneity in multi-agent learning is practically relevant but remains far from being well-understood. Motivated by this, we introduce a model of multi-population learning that allows for heterogeneous beliefs…

A central question in algorithmic game theory is to measure the inefficiency (ratio of costs) of Nash equilibria (NE) with respect to socially optimal solutions. The two established metrics used for this purpose are price of anarchy (POA)…

We consider multi-player graph games with partial-observation and parity objective. While the decision problem for three-player games with a coalition of the first and second players against the third player is undecidable, we present a…

We present a general framework for evolutionary learning to emergent unbiased state representation without any supervision. Evolutionary frameworks such as self-play converge to bad local optima in case of multi-agent reinforcement learning…

A wide variety of goals could cause an AI to disable its off switch because "you can't fetch the coffee if you're dead" (Russell 2019). Prior theoretical work on this shutdown problem assumes that humans know everything that AIs do. In…

Artificial intelligence has advanced significantly through the development of intelligent game-playing systems, providing rigorous testbeds for decision-making, strategic planning, and adaptive learning. However, resource-constrained…

A basic lesson from game theory is that strategic behavior often renders the equilibrium outcome inefficient. The recent literature of information design -- a.k.a. signaling or persuasion -- looks to improve equilibria by providing…

Min-max optimization problems (i.e., min-max games) have attracted a great deal of attention recently as their applicability to a wide range of machine learning problems has become evident. In this paper, we study min-max games with…

Trust region methods are widely applied in single-agent reinforcement learning problems due to their monotonic performance-improvement guarantee at every iteration. Nonetheless, when applied in multi-agent settings, the guarantee of trust…

Large Language Models (LLMs) often generate incorrect or unsupported content, known as hallucinations. Existing detection methods rely on heuristics or simple models over isolated computational traces such as activations, or attention maps.…

LLM agents are known to deviate from Nash equilibria in strategic interactions, but nobody has looked inside the model to understand why, or asked whether the deviation can be reversed. We do both. Working with four open-source models…

We study a game between liquidity provider and liquidity taker agents interacting in an over-the-counter market, for which the typical example is foreign exchange. We show how a suitable design of parameterized families of reward functions…