相关论文: Coordinated Multi-Domain Deception: A Stackelberg …

Despite the advantage of preserving data privacy, federated learning (FL) still suffers from the straggler issue due to the limited computing resources of distributed clients and the unreliable wireless communication environment. By…

In the field of network security, with the ongoing arms race between attackers, seeking new vulnerabilities to bypass defense mechanisms and defenders reinforcing their prevention, detection and response strategies, the novel concept of…

We study a class of games, in which the adversary (attacker) is to satisfy a complex mission specified in linear temporal logic, and the defender is to prevent the adversary from achieving its goal. A deceptive defender can allocate decoys,…

We study a target coverage problem in which a team of sensing agents, operating under limited communication, must collaboratively monitor targets that may be adaptively repositioned by an attacker. We model this interaction as a zero-sum…

Deception plays a key role in adversarial or strategic interactions for the purpose of self-defence and survival. This paper introduces a general framework and solution to address deception. Most existing approaches for deception consider…

Deceptive patterns are design practices embedded in digital platforms to manipulate users, representing a widespread and long-standing issue in the web and mobile software development industry. Legislative actions highlight the urgency of…

The new generation of cyber threats leverages advanced AI-aided methods, which make them capable to launch multi-stage, dynamic, and effective attacks. Current cyber-defense systems encounter various challenges to defend against such new…

This paper investigates Cross-Domain Sequential Recommendation (CDSR), a promising method that uses information from multiple domains (more than three) to generate accurate and diverse recommendations, and takes into account the sequential…

In Stackelberg security games, a defender seeks to randomly allocate limited security resources to protect critical targets from an attack. In this paper, we study a fundamental, yet underexplored, phenomenon in security games, which we…

We formulate a Stackelberg game between an attacker and a defender of a power system. The attacker attempts to alter the load setpoints of the power system covertly and intelligently, so that the voltage stability margin of the grid is…

A significant amount of society's infrastructure can be modeled using graph structures, from electric and communication grids, to traffic networks, to social networks. Each of these domains are also susceptible to the cascading spread of…

The vulnerability of machine learning systems to adversarial attacks questions their usage in many applications. In this paper, we propose a randomized diversification as a defense strategy. We introduce a multi-channel architecture in a…

Cyber warfare has become a critical dimension of modern conflict, driven by society's increasing dependence on interconnected digital and physical infrastructure. Effective cyber defense often requires decision-making at different echelons,…

As large language models (LLMs) grow more capable, concerns about their safe deployment have also grown. Although alignment mechanisms have been introduced to deter misuse, they remain vulnerable to carefully designed adversarial prompts.…

The processing and storage of critical data in large-scale cloud networks necessitate the need for scalable security solutions. It has been shown that deploying all possible security measures incurs a cost on performance by using up…

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information…

We study automated intrusion response for an IT infrastructure and formulate the interaction between an attacker and a defender as a partially observed stochastic game. To solve the game we follow an approach where attack and defense…

We consider a repeated sequential game between a learner, who plays first, and an opponent who responds to the chosen action. We seek to design strategies for the learner to successfully interact with the opponent. While most previous…

In this work, we introduce the Deceptive Resource Allocation Game (DRAG), which studies purposeful deception within a Bayesian game framework. In DRAG, a Defender allocates resources across the true asset and several decoys to influence an…

Cyber deception assists in increasing the attacker's budget in reconnaissance or any early phases of threat intrusions. In the past, numerous methods of cyber deception have been adopted, such as IP address randomization, the creation of…