相关论文: Power Side-Channel Analysis of the CVA6 RISC-V Cor…

Side-channel attacks on microprocessors, like the RISC-V, exhibit security vulnerabilities that lead to several design challenges. Hence, it is imperative to study and analyze these security vulnerabilities comprehensively. In this paper,…

Power side-channel attacks (SCAs) have become a major concern to the security community due to their non-invasive feature, low-cost, and effectiveness in extracting secret information from hardware implementation of cryto algorithms.…

Cryptographic computations are fundamental to modern computing, ensuring data confidentiality and integrity. However, these operations are highly vulnerable to power side-channel attacks that exploit variations in power consumption to leak…

RISC-V is an emerging technology, with applications ranging from embedded devices to high-performance servers. Therefore, more and more security-critical workloads will be conducted with code that is compiled for RISC-V. Well-known…

A performance model of CVA6 RISC-V processor is built to evaluate performance related modifications before implementing them in RTL. Its accuracy is 99.2% on CoreMark. This model is used to evaluate a superscalar feature for CVA6. During…

RISC-V processors are becoming ubiquitous in critical applications, but their susceptibility to microarchitectural side-channel attacks is a serious concern. Detection of microarchitectural attacks in RISC-V is an emerging research topic…

This paper demonstrates a power analysis-based Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attack on the SNOW-V encryption algorithm, which is a 5G mobile communication security standard candidate. Implemented on an STM32 microcontroller, power traces…

While interest in the open RISC-V instruction set architecture is growing, tools to assess the security of concrete processor implementations are lacking. There are dedicated tools and benchmarks for common microarchitectural side-channel…

Power side-channel attacks are a very effective cryptanalysis technique that can infer secret keys of security ICs by monitoring the power consumption. Since the emergence of practical attacks in the late 90s, they have been a major threat…

Open-source RISC-V cores are increasingly adopted in high-end embedded domains such as automotive, where maximizing instructions per cycle (IPC) is becoming critical. Building on the industry-supported open-source CVA6 core and its…

Power side-channel (PSC) attacks are well-known threats to sensitive hardware like advanced encryption standard (AES) crypto cores. Given the significant impact of supply voltages (VCCs) on power profiles, various countermeasures based on…

Edge AI inference is becoming prevalent thanks to the emergence of small yet high-performance microprocessors. This shift from cloud to edge processing brings several benefits in terms of energy savings, improved latency, and increased…

The power consumption of a microprocessor is a huge channel for information leakage. While the most popular exploitation of this channel is to recover cryptographic keys from embedded devices, other applications such as mobile app…

This paper presents SNOW-SCA, the first power side-channel analysis (SCA) attack of a 5G mobile communication security standard candidate, SNOW-V, running on a 32-bit ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller. First, we perform a generic known-key…

Secret keys can be extracted from the power consumption or electromagnetic emanations of unprotected devices. Traditional counter-measures have limited scope of protection, and impose several restrictions on how sensitive data must be…

Pre-silicon side-channel leakage assessment is a useful tool to identify hardware vulnerabilities at design time, but it requires many high-resolution power traces and increases the power simulation cost of the design. By downsampling and…

Leakage contracts have recently been proposed as a new security abstraction at the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) level. Such contracts aim to faithfully capture the information processors may leak through side effects of their…

While side-channel leakage is traditionally evaluated from a fabricated chip, it is more time-efficient and cost-effective to do so during the design phase of the chip. We present a methodology to rank the gates of a design according to…

Side-channel attacks have empowered bypassing of cryptographic components in circuits. Power side-channel (PSC) attacks have received particular traction, owing to their non-invasiveness and proven effectiveness. Aside from prior art…

Covert channels enable information leakage across security boundaries of the operating system. Microarchitectural covert channels exploit changes in execution timing resulting from competing access to limited hardware resources. We use the…