相关论文: Designing Inferable Signaling Schemes for Bayesian…

We study a continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg game in which a leader seeks to accomplish a primary objective while inferring a hidden parameter of a rational follower. The follower solves an entropy-regularized tracking problem and…

An analyst observes the frequency with which an agent takes actions, but not the frequency with which she takes actions conditional on a payoff relevant state. In this setting, we ask when the analyst can rationalize the agent's choices as…

We present a method for active inference with partial observations in stochastic systems through incentive design, also known as the leader-follower game. Consider a leader agent who aims to infer a follower agent's type given a finite set…

Stackelberg games (SGs) constitute the most fundamental and acclaimed models of strategic interactions involving some form of commitment. Moreover, they form the basis of more elaborate models of this kind, such as, e.g., Bayesian…

Bayesian experimental design (BED) provides a principled framework for optimizing data collection by choosing experiments that are maximally informative about unknown parameters. However, existing methods cannot deal with the joint…

Implicit stochastic models, where the data-generation distribution is intractable but sampling is possible, are ubiquitous in the natural sciences. The models typically have free parameters that need to be inferred from data collected in…

We consider a sender-receiver game with an outside option for the sender. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject. We study situations in which the sender's approval is crucial to…

We investigate the strategic behavior of a large population of agents who decide whether to adopt a costly partially effective protection or remain unprotected against the susceptible-infected-susceptible epidemic. In contrast with most…

Information design (ID) explores how a sender influence the optimal behavior of receivers to achieve specific objectives. While ID originates from everyday human communication, existing game-theoretic and machine learning methods often…

In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…

Experimental design is crucial for inference where limitations in the data collection procedure are present due to cost or other restrictions. Optimal experimental designs determine parameters that in some appropriate sense make the data…

We study the canonical signaling game, endowing the sender with commitment power: before learning the state, sender designs a strategy, which maps the state into a probability distribution over actions. We provide a geometric…

It is well known that reinforcement learning can be cast as inference in an appropriate probabilistic model. However, this commonly involves introducing a distribution over agent trajectories with probabilities proportional to exponentiated…

This paper addresses the question whether model knowledge can guide a defender to appropriate decisions, or not, when an attacker intrudes into control systems. The model-based defense scheme considered in this study, namely Bayesian…

This paper analyzes a dynamic interaction between a fully rational, privately informed sender and a boundedly rational, uninformed receiver with memory constraints. The sender controls the flow of information, while the receiver designs a…

Persuasion studies how an informed principal may influence the behavior of agents by the strategic provision of payoff-relevant information. We focus on the fundamental multi-receiver model by Arieli and Babichenko (2019), in which there…

A network of agents attempt to learn some unknown state of the world drawn by nature from a finite set. Agents observe private signals conditioned on the true state, and form beliefs about the unknown state accordingly. Each agent may face…

We consider the multi-sender persuasion problem: multiple players with informational advantage signal to convince a single self-interested actor to take certain actions. This problem generalizes the seminal Bayesian Persuasion framework and…

This paper studies a particular sensor network model which involves one single Gaussian source observed by many sensors, subject to additive independent Gaussian observation noise. Sensors communicate with the receiver over an additive…

The digital telecommunications receiver is an important context for inference methodology, the key objective being to minimize the expected loss function in recovering the transmitted information. For that criterion, the optimal decision is…