相关论文: LLM-Stackelberg Games: Conjectural Reasoning Equil…
We introduce the LLM-Nash framework, a game-theoretic model where agents select reasoning prompts to guide decision-making via Large Language Models (LLMs). Unlike classical games that assume utility-maximizing agents with full rationality,…
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly applied to domains that require reasoning about other agents' behavior, such as negotiation, policy design, and market simulation, yet existing research has mostly evaluated their adherence to…
Strategic reasoning enables agents to cooperate, communicate, and compete with other agents in diverse situations. Existing approaches to solving strategic games rely on extensive training, yielding strategies that do not generalize to new…
We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…
Game-playing ability serves as an indicator for evaluating the strategic reasoning capability of large language models (LLMs). While most existing studies rely on utility performance metrics, which are not robust enough due to variations in…
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly proposed as agents in strategic decision environments, yet their behavior in structured geopolitical simulations remains under-researched. We evaluate six popular state-of-the-art LLMs alongside…
Large language model (LLM) agents have shown remarkable progress in social deduction games (SDGs). However, existing approaches primarily focus on information processing and strategy selection, overlooking the significance of persuasive…
This paper proposes a game theoretic framework that models the interaction between prompt engineers and large language models (LLMs) as a two player extensive form game coupled with a Rapidly exploring Random Trees (RRT) search over prompt…
Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated notable capabilities across various tasks, showcasing complex problem-solving abilities. Understanding and executing complex rules, along with multi-step planning, are fundamental to logical…
As Large Language Models (LLMs) are integrated into critical real-world applications, their strategic and logical reasoning abilities are increasingly crucial. This paper evaluates LLMs' reasoning abilities in competitive environments…
LLM-driven multi-agent-based simulations have been gaining traction with applications in game-theoretic and social simulations. While most implementations seek to exploit or evaluate LLM-agentic reasoning, they often do so with a weak…
Reasoning is a fundamental capability of large language models (LLMs), enabling them to comprehend, analyze, and solve complex problems. In this paper, we introduce TextGames, an innovative benchmark specifically crafted to assess LLMs…
This paper investigates the rationality of large language models (LLMs) in strategic decision-making contexts, specifically within the framework of game theory. We evaluate several state-of-the-art LLMs across a spectrum of…
We initiate the study of structured Stackelberg games, a novel form of strategic interaction between a leader and a follower where contextual information can be predictive of the follower's (unknown) type. Motivated by applications such as…
As large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong reasoning abilities in structured tasks (e.g., coding and mathematics), we explore whether these abilities extend to strategic multi-agent environments. We investigate strategic…
We introduce LLM CHESS, an evaluation framework designed to probe the generalization of reasoning and instruction-following abilities in large language models (LLMs) through extended agentic interaction in the domain of chess. We rank over…
Strategic reasoning is a complex yet essential capability for intelligent agents. It requires Large Language Model (LLM) agents to adapt their strategies dynamically in multi-agent environments. Unlike static reasoning tasks, success in…
Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may face the exact opposite of this game-theoretic problem --…
Strategic decision-making involves interactive reasoning where agents adapt their choices in response to others, yet existing evaluations of large language models (LLMs) often emphasize Nash Equilibrium (NE) approximation, overlooking the…
When creating policies, plans, or designs for people, it is challenging for designers to foresee all of the ways in which people may reason and behave. Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have been shown to be able to simulate human…