相关论文: Shapley-Scarf Markets with Objective Indifferences

Solutions to multi-objective optimization problems can generally not be compared or ordered, due to the lack of orderability of the single objectives. Furthermore, decision-makers are often made to believe that scaled objectives can be…

We study the classical probabilistic assignment problem, where finitely many indivisible objects are to be probabilistically or proportionally assigned among an equal number of agents. Each agent has an initial deterministic endowment and a…

We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching…

We study the variant of the stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the agents are allowed to include indifferences. We present a mechanism for producing Pareto-stable matchings in stable marriage markets with indifferences that…

Shapley and Scarf introduced a notion of stable allocation between traders and indivisible goods, when each trader has rank-ordered each of the goods. The purpose of this note is to prove that the distribution of ranks after allocation is…

We study the implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles (FPTTC) rules via simply dominant mechanisms (Pycia and Troyan, 2019) in the context of assignment problems, where agents are to be assigned at most one indivisible object and…

For object reallocation problems, if preferences are strict but otherwise unrestricted, the Top Trading Cycles rule (TTC) is the leading rule: It is the only rule satisfying efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness.…

We study superreplication of European contingent claims in discrete time in a large trader model with market indifference prices recently proposed by Bank and Kramkov. We introduce a suitable notion of efficient friction in this framework,…

Considering a group of users, each specifying individual preferences over categorical attributes, the problem of determining a set of objects that are objectively preferable by all users is challenging on two levels. First, we need to…

Social choice functions (SCFs) map the preferences of a group of agents over some set of alternatives to a non-empty subset of alternatives. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem has shown that only extremely restrictive SCFs are strategyproof…

Data regulations increasingly enable consumers to switch among market segments, making segmentation an endogenous outcome of strategic interaction. We study a model in which consumers choose segments before a monopolist sets…

We employ the consistency principle to evaluate core concepts in an indivisible object allocation model with intricate co-ownership. In this environment, the strong core is consistent but may be empty, the weak core is nonempty but neither…

When allocating indivisible objects via lottery, planners often use ordinal mechanisms, which elicit agents' rankings of objects rather than their full preferences over lotteries. In such an ordinal informational environment, planners…

Tradable mobility credit (TMC) schemes are an approach to travel demand management that have received significant attention in recent years. This paper proposes and analyzes alternative market models for a TMC system -- focusing on market…

Constant price impact functions, much used in financial literature, are shown to give rise to paradoxical outcomes since they do not allow for proper predictability removal: for instance the exploitation of a single large trade whose size…

When a robot autonomously performs a complex task, it frequently must balance competing objectives while maintaining safety. This becomes more difficult in uncertain environments with stochastic outcomes. Enhancing transparency in the…

Mechanism design on social networks is a hot research direction recently, and we have seen many interesting results in auctions and matching. Compared to the traditional settings, the new goal of the network settings is that we need to…

Fairness in clustering has been considered extensively in the past; however, the trade-off between the two objectives -- e.g., can we sacrifice just a little in the quality of the clustering to significantly increase fairness, or…

In a many-to-one matchingmodel with responsive preferences in which indifferences are allowed, we study three notions of core, three notions of stability, and their relationships. We show that (i) the core contains the stable set, (ii) the…

Financial markets are often modelled as if time were unique and continuous across assets and markets. Financial markets are however asynchronous, order flow is event-driven, and waiting times between events are often random. Many of the…