相关论文: Imitation Learning of Correlated Policies in Stack…

In multi-agent problems requiring a high degree of cooperation, success often depends on the ability of the agents to adapt to each other's behavior. A natural solution concept in such settings is the Stackelberg equilibrium, in which the…

We investigate a co-design problem, encompassing simultaneous design of system infrastructure and control, through a game-theoretical framework. To this end, we propose the co-design problem as a two-layer hierarchical strategic…

Autocurricular training is an important sub-area of multi-agent reinforcement learning~(MARL) that allows multiple agents to learn emergent skills in an unsupervised co-evolving scheme. The robotics community has experimented autocurricular…

Guided cooperation allows intelligent agents with heterogeneous capabilities to work together by following a leader-follower type of interaction. However, the associated control problem becomes challenging when the leader agent does not…

Many real-world strategic games involve interactions between multiple players. We study a hierarchical multi-player game structure, where players with asymmetric roles can be separated into leaders and followers, a setting often referred to…

In many settings of interest, a policy is set by one party, the leader, in order to influence the action of another party, the follower, where the follower's response is determined by some private information. A natural question to ask is,…

Designing socially optimal policies in multi-agent environments is a fundamental challenge in both economics and artificial intelligence. This paper studies a general framework for learning Stackelberg equilibria in dynamic and uncertain…

Strategic interaction in congested systems is commonly modelled using Stackelberg games, where competing leaders anticipate the behaviour of self-interested followers. A key limitation of existing models is that they typically ignore agents…

In this work, we present the first theoretical analysis of multi-agent imitation learning (MAIL) in linear Markov games where both the transition dynamics and each agent's reward function are linear in some given features. We demonstrate…

We initiate the study of structured Stackelberg games, a novel form of strategic interaction between a leader and a follower where contextual information can be predictive of the follower's (unknown) type. Motivated by applications such as…

We introduce a reinforcement learning framework for economic design where the interaction between the environment designer and the participants is modeled as a Stackelberg game. In this game, the designer (leader) sets up the rules of the…

Training agents in multi-agent competitive games presents significant challenges due to their intricate nature. These challenges are exacerbated by dynamics influenced not only by the environment but also by opponents' strategies. Existing…

Automated decision-making tools increasingly assess individuals to determine if they qualify for high-stakes opportunities. A recent line of research investigates how strategic agents may respond to such scoring tools to receive favorable…

In multi-agent systems, complex interacting behaviors arise due to the high correlations among agents. However, previous work on modeling multi-agent interactions from demonstrations is primarily constrained by assuming the independence…

Macroeconomic outcomes emerge from individuals' decisions, making it essential to model how agents interact with macro policy via consumption, investment, and labor choices. We formulate this as a dynamic Stackelberg game: the government…

We study Stackelberg games where a principal repeatedly interacts with a non-myopic long-lived agent, without knowing the agent's payoff function. Although learning in Stackelberg games is well-understood when the agent is myopic, dealing…

Information uncertainty is one of the major challenges facing applications of game theory. In the context of Stackelberg games, various approaches have been proposed to deal with the leader's incomplete knowledge about the follower's…

In multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), self-interested agents attempt to establish equilibrium and achieve coordination depending on game structure. However, existing MARL approaches are mostly bound by the simultaneous actions of…

Zero-shot coordination problem in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), which requires agents to adapt to unseen agents, has attracted increasing attention. Traditional approaches often rely on the Self-Play (SP) framework to generate…

As assembly tasks grow in complexity, collaboration among multiple robots becomes essential for task completion. However, centralized task planning has become inadequate for adapting to the increasing intelligence and versatility of robots,…