相关论文: Cycles and collusion in congestion games under Q-l…

In this paper, we examine the robustness of Nash equilibria in continuous games, under both strategic and dynamic uncertainty. Starting with the former, we introduce the notion of a robust equilibrium as those equilibria that remain…

Nash equilibrium is the most commonly-used notion of equilibrium in game theory. However, it suffers from numerous problems. Some are well known in the game theory community; for example, the Nash equilibrium of repeated prisoner's dilemma…

We propose a new class of game-theoretic models for network formation in which strategies are not directly related to edge choices, but instead correspond more generally to the exertion of social effort. The observed social network is thus…

Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…

The recent emergence of navigational tools has changed traffic patterns and has now enabled new types of congestion-aware routing control like dynamic road pricing. Using the fundamental diagram of traffic flows - applied in macroscopic and…

The Naming Game is a model of non-equilibrium dynamics for the self-organized emergence of a linguistic convention or a communication system in a population of agents with pairwise local interactions. We present an extensive study of its…

Theory of quantum games is a new area of investigation that has gone through rapid development during the last few years. Initial motivation for playing games, in the quantum world, comes from the possibility of re-formulating quantum…

Correlated equilibrium generalizes Nash equilibrium by allowing a central coordinator to guide players' actions through shared recommendations, similar to how routing apps guide drivers. We investigate how a coordinator can learn a…

This article introduces a class of $Nash$ games among $Stackelberg$ players ($NASPs$), namely, a class of simultaneous non-cooperative games where the players solve sequential Stackelberg games. Specifically, each player solves a…

We study the existence and computation of Nash equilibria in concave games where the players' admissible strategies are subject to shared coupling constraints. Under playerwise concavity of constraints, we prove existence of Nash…

We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered…

We study the inefficiency of equilibria for various classes of games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i's perceived cost is a convex combination of 1-\alpha_i times his direct…

We consider a non-atomic congestion game where each decision maker performs selfish optimization over states of a common MDP. The decision makers optimize for their own expected costs, and influence each other through congestion effects on…

In general, Nash equilibria in normal-form games may require players to play (probabilistically) mixed strategies. We define a measure of the complexity of finite probability distributions and study the complexity required to play Nash…

In this paper, we examine the Nash equilibrium convergence properties of no-regret learning in general N-player games. For concreteness, we focus on the archetypal follow the regularized leader (FTRL) family of algorithms, and we consider…

We study the global convergence of policy optimization for finding the Nash equilibria (NE) in zero-sum linear quadratic (LQ) games. To this end, we first investigate the landscape of LQ games, viewing it as a nonconvex-nonconcave…

Systems of competing agents can often be modeled as games. Assuming rationality, the most likely outcomes are given by an equilibrium (e.g. a Nash equilibrium). In many practical settings, games are influenced by context, i.e. additional…

The framework of multi-agent learning explores the dynamics of how individual agent strategies evolve in response to the evolving strategies of other agents. Of particular interest is whether or not agent strategies converge to well known…

In finite games mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To assess the relevance of this nonexistence, we consider games where the payoffs are drawn at random. In particular, we focus on games where a large…

This work studies Nash equilibria for games where a mixture of coordinating and anti-coordinating agents, with possibly heterogeneous thresholds, coexist and interact through an all-to-all network. Whilst games with only coordinating or…