相关论文: Metric Distortion of Obnoxious Distributed Voting

Complexity of voting manipulation is a prominent topic in computational social choice. In this work, we consider a two-stage voting manipulation scenario. First, a malicious party (an attacker) attempts to manipulate the election outcome in…

We study mechanisms for candidate selection that seek to minimize the social cost, where voters and candidates are associated with points in some underlying metric space. The social cost of a candidate is the sum of its distances to each…

We consider a distributed multi-agent network system where the goal is to minimize a sum of convex objective functions of the agents subject to a common convex constraint set. Each agent maintains an iterate sequence and communicates the…

The voting process is formalized as a multistage voting model with successive alternative elimination. A finite number of agents vote for one of the alternatives each round subject to their preferences. If the number of votes given to the…

We consider a model where an agent is must choose between alternatives that each provide only an imprecise description of the world (e.g. linguistic expressions). The set of alternatives is closed under logical conjunction and disjunction,…

In an election, we are given a set of voters, each having a preference list over a set of candidates, that are distributed on a social network. We consider a scenario where voters may change their preference lists as a consequence of the…

An important problem in computational social choice theory is the complexity of undesirable behavior among agents, such as control, manipulation, and bribery in election systems. These kinds of voting strategies are often tempting at the…

In this paper, we analyze the convergence of a distributed Robbins-Monro algorithm for both constrained and unconstrained optimization in multi-agent systems. The algorithm searches for local minima of a (nonconvex) objective function which…

In this paper, a class of large-scale distributed nonsmooth convex optimization problem over time-varying multi-agent network is investigated. Specifically, the decision space which can be split into several blocks of convex set is…

In this paper, we study some multiagent variants of the knapsack problem. Fluschnik et al. [AAAI 2019] considered the model in which every agent assigns some utility to every item. They studied three preference aggregation rules for finding…

We consider the problem of predicting winners in elections, for the case where we are given complete knowledge about all possible candidates, all possible voters (together with their preferences), but where it is uncertain either which…

Many democratic societies use district-based elections, where the region under consideration is geographically divided into districts and a representative is chosen for each district based on the preferences of the electors who reside…

We consider the distributed optimization problem for a multi-agent system. Here, multiple agents cooperatively optimize an objective by sharing information through a communication network and performing computations. In this tutorial, we…

This paper focuses on a class of inclusion problems of maximal monotone operators in a multi-agent network, where each agent is characterized by an operator that is not available to any other agents, but the agents can cooperate by…

The Coalitional Manipulation problem has been studied extensively in the literature for many voting rules. However, most studies have focused on the complete information setting, wherein the manipulators know the votes of the…

This paper is devoted to distributed continuous-time and discrete-time optimization problems with nonuniform convex constraint sets and nonuniform stepsizes for general differentiable convex objective functions. The communication graphs are…

We study distributed optimization in a cooperative multi-agent setting, where agents have to agree on the usage of shared resources and can communicate via a time-varying network to this purpose. Each agent has its own decision variables…

We study the design of voting mechanisms in a binary social choice environment where agents' cardinal valuations are independent but not necessarily identically distributed. The mechanism must be anonymous -- the outcome is invariant to…

How should an agent (the sender) observing multi-dimensional data (the state vector) persuade another agent to take the desired action? We show that it is always optimal for the sender to perform a (non-linear) dimension reduction by…

We consider an agent community wishing to decide on several binary issues by means of issue-by-issue majority voting. For each issue and each agent, one of the two options is better than the other. However, some of the agents may be…